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It is a well established principle that a release of a cause
of action for a tort discharges that cause of action.' How-
ever, such a release is ineffective where it was procured
as a result of fraud, mistake, duress, or while the releasor
was incompetent.2 If the releasor is given a cause of ac-
tion for damages for personal injuries, justice would
seem to demand that he restore whatever consideration
he has received for his release. The time and nature of
this restoration is what concerns us here.
The real question is the extent of the plaintiff's right
to sue for the damages for his personal injuries and not
the avoidance of the release. However, it is usually stated
that before the action can be brought the ineffective re-
lease must be avoided And it is usually said that restora-
tion of the consideration is an element of that avoidance."
Thus we have such statements as:
[A] return of the money, or an offer to return, received
by the plaintiff from the defendant is part of the act of
rescission, and so long as the contract remains unre-
scinded it binds both parties; and the defrauded party
has no cause of action for the property or consideration
1 RESTATEmE, TORTS § 900 (1939).
2 RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 900, comment b (1939).
3 East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. v. Hayes, 83 Ga. 558, 10 S.E. 350 (1889);
Randall v. Port Huron, St. C. & M. C. Ry., 215 Mich. 413, 184 N.W. 435 (1921);
Levister v. Southern Ry., 56 S.C. 508, 35 S.E. 207 (1900).
4 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 480 (1932), avoidance for fraud.
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parted with or released under the fraudulent contract
until the contract has been rescinded.5
Comparable statements have been made where the release
was sought to be avoided because of duress.' Because of
this attitude of the courts a short look at the treatment
given to the requirement of restoration as an element of
rescission is in order.
The distinction between rescission at law and in equity
is a classical one. In an action at law the plaintiff proceeds
on the theory that there has been a rescission, while in
equity he asks the court to grant him the rescission.7 The
courts have said that there could be no completed rescis-
sion so long as the plaintiff retained some of the proceeds
of the contract.' Thus, if in an action at law the plaintiff
is proceeding on the theory that there has been a rescission,
and restoration of what he has received is necessary to
that rescission, the restoration is said to be a condition
precedent to the bringing of the action.' On the other hand
if the plaintiff is asking a court of equity to do the rescind-
ing for him, he may keep what he has received and allow
the court to restore the status quo by its decree.' °
Usually assigned as a reason for these results is that the
courts of law, unlike the courts of equity, had no power
to render a conditional decree." If restoration were not
required of the plaintiff, a judgment in his favor would
leave him in possession of the consideration he had already
received and would require the defendant to maintain an
5 East Tennessee, V. & G. Ry. v. Hayes, 83 Ga. 558, 10 S.E. 350, 351
(1889).
6 Gilbert v. Wilson, 237 Ala. 645, 188 So. 260 (1939).
7 E.g., Gould v. Cayuga County Nat'l Bank, 86 N.Y. 75, 82-83 (1881);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 481 (1932).
8 Levister v. Southern Ry., 56 S.C. 508, 35 S.E. 207 (1900).
9 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 481, comment a (1932); RESTATEMNT, ES-
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action to recover it.' 2
Another reason assigned for this difference is that in a
law action the plaintiff would be acting inconsistently, if,
while contending that there is no contract, he were al-
lowed to retain the fruits of that contract. 3 In the equi-
table action where he alleges a willingness to restore what
he has received if the court should rescind the contract,
there is no inconsistency in allowing him to retain the con-
sideration until the court decrees the rescission.
There has been no marked change in this distinction be-
tween actions at law and in equity since the adoption of
the procedure codes. In fact, in at least one case, by classify-
ing the defect in the release as a legal defense, the require-
ments were made even stricter as a result of the code.' 4
There are, of course, some instances where as a result of
the codes, the courts have adopted the more lenient pro-
cedures of the courts of equity. 5 Originally, actions for
rescission of releases were exclusively equitable,'6 and in
some instances the question of avoidance of the releases
arises in the courts of equity today.' Before the present
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal decisions held
that a plaintiff must first go into equity to have the release
rescinded before he could maintain his action for damages
for personal injuries.'" Today, however, by far the ma-
jority of the cases in which the question arises are in the
courts of law. Hence, we are confronted with the usual
32 Monnier v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 129 N.E2d 800 (Ind. App.
1955).
13 Rabitte v. Alabama Great So. R.R., 158 Ala. 431, 47 So. 573 (1908).
'4 Carroll v. United Rys., 157 Mo. App. 247, 137 S.W. 303 (1911).
-5 In re Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1939); Plews v. Burrage, 274
Fed. 881 (1st Cir. 1921); Sanford v. Royal Ins. Co., 11 Wash. 653, 40 Pac.
609 (1895).
16 5 WiLisTON, CoNTRACTs § 1525 (Rev. ed. 1937).
"7 Early v. Martin, 331 Ill. App. 55, 72 N.E.2d 562 (1947). Accord, Union
Pac. R.R. v. Syas, 246 Fed. 561 (8th Cir. 1917), indicates that the action must
be tried in equity.
38 Vandervelden v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 61 Fed. 54 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1894).
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statement that a restoration of what has been received
under the release is a condition to the bringing of an ac-
tion for damages for personal injuries.
An additional reason for requiring restoration is a fear
on the part of the courts that an unprincipled releasor
would take advantage of the defendant if difficult hurdles
are not placed in his path toward avoiding the release."9
Thus, in a recent case it was said that if the court did not
require restoration:
I .. settlements of unliquidated claims, particularly in
tort actions for personal injuries, would be frequently
i but an idle ceremony, for he who would part with his
money to avoid litigation and mutually adjust claims of
an unascertained amount would have no assurance that
thereafter, when the memory of honest witnesses is be-
clouded by the lapse of time or they are no longer
available, an unprincipled releasor might assert fraud,
and with nothing to lose and a possibility of gain, harass
the foolish settlor with claims, demands and expensive
litigation.
The established policy of the law to encourage com-
promise and amicable settlement of conflicting claims
would be set at naught by a general rule such as
appellant contends for. The unscrupulous releasor being
under no duty to restore the consideration he received
and being subject only to the possibility of having it set
off against any judgment he might recover, could use the
very money he received in compromise to prosecute sub-
sequent actions and, if unsuccessful therein, force the
releasee to further, and probably vain, protracted and
expensive legal action for the attempted recovery
thereof.2 0
While this statement may be true where the amount re-
ceived for the release is a substantial sum, one wonders if
it is valid in those frequent cases where the amount which
19 Monnier v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 129 N.E.2d 800 (Ind. App.
1955); Doyle v. New York, 0. & W. Ry., 66 App. Div. 398, 72 N.Y. Supp. 936
(4th Dep't 1901).
20 Monnier v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 129 N.E.2d 800, 805 (Ind.
App. 1955).
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has been received for the release is as little as ten dollars.
The true rationale for this requirement is that restora-
tion is required to avoid the unjust enrichment which will
result if the plaintiff is allowed to retain what he has re-
ceived under the contract.2" The distinction between the
legal and the equitable actions could be explained on that
ground. The courts of law could not by their judgment
prevent the unjust enrichment whereas the courts of equity
could do so by the use of a conditional decree. Unfortunate-
ly the tendency has been for the courts to apply the rule
without considering its purpose. As a result it has become
a mere technical requirement. At times its application has
operated to protect a fraudulent defendant rather than to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff. One court
has gone so far as to say that the reason for requiring
restoration "is not a question of damage to the defendant
but of the right of the plaintiff to proceed."'
The requirement of restoration as a condition to rescis-
sion has been embodied in the statutes of some of the
states.23 These statutes have been applied to the rescission
of releases of causes of action for torts.' They have been
interpreted, however, as being only codifications of the
common, law rule.' Since there is no apparent difference
in the way courts operating under the statutes have treated
the rule from the way in which it has been treated where
there are no such statutes, no distinction will be made in
this paper as to whether the source of the rule is common
21- Kercher v. Brown, 72 N.E.2d 588 (Ohio App. 1947);" REsTATE mET,
RESTrrUON § 65, comment e (1937).
22 Memphis St. Ry. v. Giardino, 116 Tenn. 368, 92 S.W. 855, 858 (1906).
23 CAL. CIv. CODE, § 1691 (Deering 1949); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-104 (1936);
MoNT. REV. CODES AWN. § 17-907 (1947); N. D. REV. CODE, § 9-0904 (1943);
OEMLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 235 (1937); S. D. CODE, § 37.0703 (1939).
21 Weddle v. Heath, 211 Cal. 445, 295 Pac. 832 (1931); Garcia v. Cali-
fornia Truck Co., 183 Cal. 767, 192 Pac. 708 (1920); Gilmore v. Western
Elec. Co., 42 N.D. 206, 172 N.W. U1 (1919); Swan v. Great Northern Ry., 40
N.D. 258, 168 N.W. 657 (1918).




Closely akin to the question of the requirement of
restoration is the problem of the election of remedies: has
the plaintiff by accepting benefits under the release there-
by elected to "affirm" or "ratify" the transaction?26 It is
not possible in all cases to determine whether the court is
refusing its relief on this ground or because the plaintiff
has failed to restore the consideration.27 It may be that the
two are but facets of the same problem. However, a dis-
cussion of that possibility is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another closely related problem is the requirement that
a person desiring to rescind must indicate his intention
to do so and must return the consideration he has received
within a reasonable time after the discovery of the defect.'
It is also difficult in many cases to determine whether the
court is refusing relief because the plaintiff has not return-
ed the consideration before suit and therefore cannot main-
tain his action, or whether the plaintiff has not acted with-
in a reasonable time after the discovery of the defect and
therefore is not entitled to rescind.29 Again, this question
is outside the scope of our present inquiry.
In requiring the restoration as an element of avoiding a
contract the courts have not drawn a distinction between
the kinds of contracts involved, nor between the grounds
for the avoidance of the contracts. 0 Substantially the same
rules have been stated whether the contract is sought to be
avoided for fraud, duress, breach, incompetency, or mis-
26 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 484 (1932).
27 E.g., Johnson v. Shreveport Water-Works Co., 109 La. 268, 33 So. 309
(1903).
28 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 483 (1) (1932); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION
§ 64 (1937).
29 E.g., Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jordan, 170 Ala. 530, 54
So. 280 (1911); Harrison v. Alabama Midland Ry., 144 Ala. 24, 40 So. 394
(1906); Randall v. Port Huron St. C. & M. C. Ry., 215 Mich. 413, 184 N.W. 435
(1921); Brown v. Walker Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 161, 122 S.E. 670 (1924).
-o See Note, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 791 (1929), where the author investigates
the requirement in suits for rescission for fraud.
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take.3" In the field of release of causes of action for tort,
however, there has been more confusion, and the courts
have been in more disagreement than elsewhere about the
extent of the requirement and the exceptions to it.2 For
this reason we will focus our attention upon the require-
ment as it applies to the avoidance of releases of causes of
action for torts.
Some courts have stated that there is no requirement of
restoration where releases of this kind are sought to be
avoided,33 but generally the courts have not relied upon
such a distinction as a basis for an exception to the rule.
There are reasons, however, why such an exception might
be made. In some instances, consideration for the release
has been the giving up of a lien,34 the loss of a set-off,35 or
the value of room, board, or medical treatment which have
been furnished for the benefit of the plaintiff. 6 But in most
of the cases the consideration has consisted solely of
money. Thus, these releases fall within the exception that
restoration is not required where the consideration con-
sists solely of money. However, with a few exceptions,"
the courts have not used this as a reason for excusing the
requirement of restoration.
In most other contract cases, the plaintiff is seeking
31 Compare RESTATEMiENT, CONTRACTS § 349 (1932), breach of contract,
with § 480, fraud, 499, duress; RESTATETENT, RESTITUTION § 65 (1937); and 5
CoaBIN, CONTRACTS § 1114 (1951).
32 5 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1530 (Rev. ed. 1937).
33 Koshka v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 114 Kan. 126, 217 Pac. 293 (1923); Texas
Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Kennedy, 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583 (1940). Con-
tra: Baker's Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R., 287 Ky. 13, 152 S.W.2d 276 (1941);
Pickdesimer v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E2d 214 (1949). The
cases are collected in Annot., 134 A.L.R. 6 (.1941).
34 Davis v. Zoban Storage Co., 59 Ga. App. 474, 1 S.E.2d 473 (1939).
35 Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dooley, 68 Ga. App. 230, 22 S.E.2d 625
(1942).
36 The Oriental v. Barclay, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 193, 41 S.W. 117 (1897).
37 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 480 (2) (c) (1932); RESTATE=MNT, R.ESTrTu-
TION § 65(f) (1937).
38 E.g., Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, 134 Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938).
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restitution of the property or the value of the services he
has given under the contract. In the case of a release he is
interested in having his original cause of action for dam-
ages returned to him. Other factors to be weighed in re-
lease cases are the kind of misrepresentation which may
be present, the physical and mental condition of the re-
leasor, the attitude of the courts and juries toward the
release of a tort, as compared with other contracts, and
the fact that insurance or insurance companies may be in-
volved. These differences suggest the advisability of limit-
ing our inquiry to the requirement of restoration as a con-
dition to the avoidance of a release of a cause of action for
tort.39
II
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
Where a contract is said to be "void" or where it is found
that there is no contract, the usual rule has been that
restoration of what had been received was not necessary.40
Since there is no contract, there is nothing to rescind and
hence there is no requirement for the restoration of the
consideration. Thus, when a contract is said to be void
because of fraud in its execution, or fraud in the factum,
the courts have generally said that restoration is not re-
quired.4 The result is otherwise where the contract is
39 Problems similar to those encountered in releases of tort claims are
also present where there has been a release of a contract claim for unliqui-
dated damages, or where there has been a release of an unliquidated claim
upon an insurance policy. No attempt will be made to compare or contrast
these cases. Nor will any effort be made to collect or analyze such cases as
Smith v. Humphreys, 266 S.W. 487 (Mo. App. 1924), where the release was
sought to be avoided because of breach of contract.
40 RESTATmEmT, CONTRACTS § 480 (1932).
41 Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Zane, 160 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1947); In re
Clark's Estate, 318 Mich. 92, 27 N.W.2d 509 (1947); Paul v. Flannery, 128
N.J.L. 438, 26 A.2d 553 (1942); Stanford v. Zemel, 12 N.J. Misc. 133, 170 Atl.
53 (N.J. Super. 1934); Hayes v. Atlanta & C. Air-Line R.R., 143 N.C. 125, 55
S.E. 437 (1906); Ulrich v. McDonough, 89 Ohio App. 178, 101 N.E.2d 163
(1950).
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merely "voidable" because of fraud in the inducement, or
fraud in the treaty. Similarly, where duress renders the
contract voidable, restoration is not required, but where
the duress renders the contract void, restoration is neces-
sary.' If the purpose of the requirement of restoration is
to prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff, it would
seem to make no difference whether or not he has received
the consideration under a contract. The nature of the fraud
might be a factor in determining whether restoration
should be required, but the effect of the fraud upon the
contract would seem to have no such connection. Never-
theless, this same distinction-between the nature and
effect of fraud-will be found running through other situ-
ations where the courts have held that restoration is not a
requirement. It is doubtful if the distinction is either work-
able or desirable.
In Illinois the eourts have reached the conclusion that
restoration is not required in any case where the release
has been procured by fraud regardless of the nature of the
fraud.43 These courts have held that such releases are ab-
solutely void and need not be rescinded. Other courts have
reached the same result without calling the releases void.44
These latter cases have merit if the moral culpability of
the defendant is a factor in determining whether the re-
42 Schoeler v. Roth, 51 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Taylor v. Russell,
258 App. Div. 305, 16 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1939); Carroll v. Fetty, 121 W.
Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 571 (1939).
43 McDaniels v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 302 M. App. 332, 23 N.E.2d 785 (1939);
Spring Valley Coal Co. v. Buzis, 213 M. 341, 72 N.E. 1060 (1904); Indiana,
D. & W. R.R. v. Fowler, 201 MI1. 152, 66 N.E. 394 (1903); Chicago, Rock Island
& Pac. Ry. v. Lewis, 109 Ill. 120 (1884).
44 Wangen v. Upper Iowa Power Co., 185 Iowa 110, 169 N.W. 668 (1918);
Great American Life Ins. Co. v. Love, 169 Okla. 35, 35 P.2d 948 (1934); St.
Louis & S. F. R.R. v. Richards, 23 Okla. 256, 102 Pac. 92 (1909); Vanormer v.
Osborn Mach. Co, 255 Pa. 47, 99 Atl. 161 (1916); Gordon v. Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co., 243 Pa. 330, 90 AUt. 78 (1914); Hedlun v. Holy Terror
Min. Co., 16 S.D. 261, 92 N.W. 31 (1902); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 51
S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). Contra: Thornton v. Puget Sound Power
& Light Co., 49 F.2d 347 (W.D. Wash. 1930); The Thomas P. Beal, 298 Fed.
121 (W.D. Wash. 1924).
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tention of the consideration would unjustly enrich the
plaintiff. And this would seem to be an important factor,
particularly in those cases where the question before the
court is whether to protect a defendant guilty of fraud or
a plaintiff who is financially unable to return what he has
received. One of the cases expresses this idea: "In such
case, the money is retained, not as a part of the considera-
tion of a contract he denies, but as a part indemnity for
the fraud perpetrated on him."4 The same idea is present
when it is held that a return of the consideration is re-
quired where the release was entered into as a result of a
mistake, but that it is not necessary where it was procured
by fraud.46
Similar to those cases which hold that restoration is not
necessary where the release is "void," are those which say
that it is not required because there is no contract.47 Such
a situation is present where it is contended that someone
other than the releasor has signed the release," or where
the release provisions are added after the releasor has
signed the paper.49 To the same effect are a few cases in
which the releasor pleads in the alternative. For example,
he may say that he did not sign the release, or if he did
sign it, he was unaware of it because he was in a dazed
condition. Likewise he may contend that he did not sign
it, or if he did, his signature was procured as a result of the
defendant's fraud or misrepresentations. 5 Another com-
parable situation is where the court holds that the agree-
45 Gordon v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., supra note 44, at 80.
46 Seymour v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 18 Iowa 218, 164 N.W. 352 (1917).
47 Watson v. Coxe Bros. Lumber Co., 203 S.C. 125, 26 S.E2d 401 (1943).
48 Rice v. Merrill, 223 Mass. 279, 111 N.E. 860 (1916); Chalmers v. United
Rys. Co., 153 Mo. App. 55, 131 S.W. 903 (1910).
49 Ingram v. Covington, F. & A. Ry., 28 Ky. L. R. 508, 89 S.W. 541 (1905);
Lucas v. Gibson, 341 Pa. 427, 19 A2d 395 (1941).
50 McKittrick v. Greenville Traction Co., 84 S.C. 275, 66 S.E. 289 (1909).
5' Southern Pac. Co. v. Gastelum, 26 Ariz. 106, 283 Pac. 719 (1929).
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ment was not a settlement of the dispute.52 There are also
the cases which have held that there was no contract be-
cause the releasor was drunk7' or incompetent54 at the
time he signed the release. It is possible that some of these
cases can be distinguished from those cases which hold
that restoration is necessary where the releasor's incapa-
city is alleged as the ground for avoiding the release.5 In
the former cases the releasor is contending that he did
not sign the release whereas in the latter cases he is ad-
mitting in his pleadings that he is now aware of the fact
that he had signed such a paper. Some cases may also be
explained on the ground that the plaintiff had spent the
money prior to the time he became aware of the fact that
he had signed a release.56
Whether the plaintiff had knowledge of receiving the
consideration is of importance in determining if or when
restoration should be required. It is a factor in determining
whether the enrichment is unjust. However, it does not
seem that the courts are justified in creating an exception
to the rule solely on the ground that in these cases there
was no contract. Even where there clearly was no inten-
tion to contract, namely, where there has been a misrepre-
sentation of the nature of the paper which was being sign-
ed,5" the non-existence of a contract should not be the only
52 Harvey v. Aceves, 115 Cal. App. 333, 1 P.2d 1043 (1931), where a fine
was not imposed on condition that the tort-feasor pay a sum to the injured
party.
53 Roy v. Kim, 208 Mich. 571, 175 N.W. 475 (1919).
54 Martin v. Sentker, 12 Ohio App. 46 (1918); Charron v. Northwestern
Fuel Co., 149 Wis. 240, 134 N.W. 1048 (1912).
55 Cases cited'in notes 109, 112, and 114, infra.
56 McKittrick v. Greenville Traction Co., 84 S.C. 275, 66 S.E. 289 (1909);
Charron v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 149 Wis. 240, 134 N.W. 1048 (1912).
57 Georgia S. & F. Ry. v. Adeeb, 15 Ga. App. 831, 84 S.E. 323 (1915), to
show a doctor how to spell her name; Ross v. Oliver Bros. & Honeycutt, 152
Ky. 437, 153 S.W. 756 (1913), statement as to the nature of his injury; Rau




consideration in determining whether restoration is neces-
sary.
By far the greatest number of cases indicating an ex-
ception to the rule, fall within a category in which the re-
leasor contends that he received the consideration believ-
ing it to be for something other than a general release. In
some of these cases he further contends that he believed,
or was led to believe, that the instrument he was signing
was a receipt or an acknowledgment." In some of these
transactions the courts have said that the contracts were
void or that there was no contract. 9 And again they have
placed the requirement of restoration on a conclusion of
"voidness" of the release rather than on the question of
unjust enrichment. Since to determine whether the en-
richment is unjust depends upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the release, we will direct our at-
tention to the nature of the transaction and the conten-
tions made by the parties and not upon the classification
of the release as voidable or void.
One group of such cases is that in which the releasor
contends that he was given the money as a gift or dona-
tion and that he was led to believe that the paper he signed
was not a release but was a receipt for the money.' ° Im-:
58 E.g., Yelloway, Inc. v. Garretson, 89 Colo. 375, 3 P.2d 292 (1931); Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58 (1877); Hogarth v.
William H. Grundy & Co., 256 Pa. 451, 100 Ati. 1001 (1917).
59 E.g., Meyer v. Haas, 126 Cal. 560, 58 Pac. 1042 (1899); Mullen v. Old
Colony RR., 127 Mass. 86 (1879); Farrington v. Harlem Say. Bank, 280 N.Y.
1, 19 N.E.2d 657 (1939).
60 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Johnston, 205 Ala. 1, 87 So. 866, cert. denied, 254
U.S. 654 (1921); Western Ry. v. Arnett, 137 Ala. 414, 34 So. 997 (1903); Yello-
-way, Inc. v. Garretson, 89 Colo. 375, 3 P.2d 292 (1931); Roberts v. Colorado
Springs & I. Ry., 45 Colo. 188, 101 Pac. 59 (1909); Mackle Constr. Co. v.
Wyatt, 29 Ga. App. 617, 116 S.E. 877 (1923); Jaques v. Sioux City Traction
Co., 124 Iowa 257, 99 N.W. 1069 (1904); Lervick v. White Top Cabs, Inc., 10
So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1942); Malkmus v. St. Louis Portland Cement Co., 150
Mo. App. 446, 131 S.W. 148 (1910); Shaw v. Webber, 29 N.Y. Supp. (79 Hun.)
437 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Jones v. Pickle, 7 Ohio App. 33 (1916); Bissett v. Port-
land Ry., Light & Power Co., 72 Ore. 441, 143 Pac. 991 (1914); Hogarth v.
William H. Grundy & Co., 256 Pa. 451, 100 AUt. 1001 (1917). Contra: Mathis'
[Vol. XXXI
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plicit in these cases is the suggestion that restoration is
not necessary since there is no agreement of the parties
to rescind. It has been held that even where there was no
misrepresentation, if the money was received without any
intention of there being a settlement, a tender was not
necessary. This was true even though no gratuity was in-
tended and the amount received was required to be de-
ducted from the judgment. 1 If the courts should find that
the money received in these cases actually was given to
the plaintiff as a gratuity, as he contends, then he would be
entitled to retain it. Under such circumstances the court
would find that there was no consideration for the release
and it could be avoided on that ground. However, it is not
seriously contended that the amount was given as a gra-
tuity but only that it was represented to be one. In avoid-
ing the release the court not only determines that the re-
lease was fraudulently procured but also that the amount
paid was not paid as a gift. Consequently, it would seem
proper that the amount received should be deducted from
any judgment the plaintiff might recover.6" Thus we are
confronted with the same problem that exists in any other
area of fraud or mistake, and no good reason can be seen
for reaching a different result because of the nature of the
misrepresentation found in these cases.
It may be that in addition to a cause of action for his in-
juries the plaintiff also has a right to insurance payments.
Where he has received the proceeds from the insurance
policy and has signed a general release believing it to be a
release only of the insurance claim, it has been held that
he need not return the consideration before maintaining
60 continued
Adm'r v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 287 Ky. 843, 155 S.W.2d 441 (1941) (the
payment of $2,500 was held to be a settlement and not a gift); Harrison
v. Southern Ry., 131 S.C. 12, 127 SE. 270 (1925).
61 Miller v. Spokane Intl Ry., 82 Wash. 170, 143 Pac. 981 (1914).
62 Roberts v. Colorado Springs & L Ry, 45 Colo. 188, 101 Pae. 59 (1909).
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an action for the injuries.63 It is interesting to observe that
the Kentucky court which has reached this conclusion re-
quired restoration in the case where the plaintiff contended
that he thought he had received the money as a gift.6" Of
course in that case the court did indicate that the instru-
ment "unambiguously" showed that the amount was paid
in settlement of the claim. The Alabama courts have also
reached opposite results in these two situations but in the
reverse order.6  A difference in the requirement of restora-
tion between a misrepresentation that the amount was
paid as a gift and the misrepresentation that it was paid
as an insurance claim is difficult to justify.
Where a release was signed in the belief that it was a
receipt for the amount which had been paid for doctor,
nurse, or hospital bills, courts have also held that a return
of the amount received was unnecessary.66 Some courts
have reached this result on the basis that the plaintiff is
not seeking a rescission, but, as in the previous situations,
is contending only that there was no contract and that
therefore rescission and its concomitant, restoration, is not
required.67 Also where there was a voluntary payment
03 Hooks v. Cornett Lewis Coal Co., 260 Ky. 778, 86 S.W.2d 697 (1935);
Brambell v. Cincinnati, F. & S. E. R.R., 132 Ky. 547, 116 S.W. 742 (1909).
Contra: United States Cast Iron & Foundry Co. v. Marler, 17 Ala. App. 358,
86 So. 103, cert. denied, Ex parte Marler, 204 Ala. 342, 86 So. 108 (1920);
Conrad v. Keller Brick Co., 31 Ohio C.C. Dec. 700 (1907), aff'd., 79 Ohio St.
461, 87 N.E. 1134 (1909).
64 Mathis' Adm'r v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 287 Ky. 843, 155 S.W.2d
441 (1941).
65 Compare Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Johnston, 205 Ala. 1, 87 So. 866, cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 654 (1921), and Western Ry. v. Arnett, 137 Ala. 414, 34 So.
997 (1903), with United States Cast Iron & Foundry Co. v. Marler, 17 Ala.
App. 358, 86 So. 103, cert. denied, Ex parte Marler, 204 Ala. 342, 86 So. 108
(1920).
66 Reneman v. Clover Splint Coal Co., 281 Ky. 57, 134 S.W.2d 978 (1939);
Barriger v. Ziegler, 241 Mich. 83, 216 N.W. 417 (1927); Green v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R.R., 213 Mo. App. 583, 251 S.W. 931 (1923); Scully v. Brooklyn
Heights R.R., 155 App. Div. 382, 140 N.Y. Supp. 260 (2d Dep't 1913); Mens-
forth v. Chicago Brass Co., 142 Wis. 546, 126 N.W. 41 (1910). Contra, Davis
v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1937), where it was mistake rather than
fraud which was involved.
67 Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. 2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028 (1939); Ty-
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prior to the signing of the release, it was held that the
voluntary payment was not consideration for the release
and therefore need not be returned." In cases of this kind
we are confronted with the fact that even if the plaintiff's
understanding of the transaction is correct, the considera-
tion was paid to discharge at least a portion of the defend-
ant's liability for his tort. It thus becomes more difficult
in these cases to accept the court's findings that simply be-
cause there is no contract, restoration is not a prerequisite
to rescission.
Many courts have permitted the plaintiff to maintain
an action for damages without requiring a tender of the
consideration paid for the release if he signed the release
believing it to be a receipt for the payment of wages. If, as
some cases indicate, this amount has been paid as back
wages and not as wages which were lost as a result of the
injury,69 it would seem that there is no connection between
the amount paid and the action for damages. These wages
would fall within the frequently stated exception that the
plaintiff need not restore that which under any circum-
stances he is entitled to retain. 0 However, the same result
has been reached in those cases where it is contended that
the payment which has been made is for wages lost as a
result of the injury.' The courts might properly distin-
67 continued
ner v. Axt, 113 Cal. App. 408, 298 Pac. 537 (1931); Farrington v. Harlem
Say. Bank, 280 N.Y. 1, 19 N.E.2d 657 (1939).
68 Simeoli v. Derby Rubber Co., 81 Conn. 423, 71 Ati. 546 (1908).
69 Tweeten v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 210 Fed. 828 (9th Cir. 1914);
Butler v. Richmond & D. R.R., 88 Ga. 594, 15 S.E. 668 (1891); Soeder Sons
Milk Co. v. Salaciensky, 32 Ohio Law Rep. 161 (1930); Robinson v. Easton,
33 Ohio C.C. Dec. 451 (1911); Howard v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 122 S.C. 518,
115 S.E. 899 (1922).
70 REsTATEMENT, REs TUoN § 65(a) (1937).
71 Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, 111 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1940); City of
Prescott v. Sumid, 30 Ariz. 347, 247 Pac. 122 (1926); Meyer v. Haas, 126
Cal. 560, 58 Pac. 1042 (1899); Atlanta & W. P. R.R. v. Robinson, 49 Ga. App.
712, 176 S.E. 550 (1934); Gable v. Central Ry., 39 Ga. App. 350, 147 S.E. 135
(1929); Stewart v. Chicago & E. I. R.R., 141 Ind. 55, 40 N.E. 67 (1895); Jeez
v. A. Y. McDonald Mfg. Co., 179 Iowa 193, 161 N.W. 62 (1917); Chicago,
R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58 (1877); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Vaughn,
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guish between these two situations, holding restoration
not necessary in the first instance but requiring it in the
latter. Such a distinction has been made.7 2 It has also been
indicated that the amount received in these cases should
be deducted from the judgment awarded to the plaintiff."
Again, in most of these cases the thing for which the plain-
tiff believed the release was signed is but an element of
the damages for the tort itself. Therefore, in this instance
it is difficult to justify an exception to the rule on the
ground that there is no contract.
The requirement of restoration of consideration has been
excused where the plaintiff received the consideration and
signed the release believing it to cover only injuries to
personal property.7 In a couple of these cases the objec-
tion was raised that, since there was but one cause of ac-
tion for the injuries to the person and to the property, an
agreement intended to be a settlement of only one would
bar the action for the other.' In both cases the courts held
that such a limitation in the rules of pleading did not ap-
71 continued
33 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 111 S.W. 707 (1908); McGill v. Louisville & N. R.R., 114
Ky. 358, 70 S.W. 1048 (1902); Houghtaling v. Banfield, 8 S.W.2d 1023 (Mo.
App. 1928); Loveless v. Cunard Mining Co., 201 S.W. 375 (Mo. App. 1918);
Lassell v. Mellon, 219 App. Div. 589, 220 N.Y. Supp. 235 (2d Dep't 1927);
Herman v. P. H. Fitzgibbons Boiler Co., 136 App. Div. 286, 120 N.Y. Supp.
1074 (4th Dep't 1910); Cleary v. Municipal Elec. Light Co., 19 N.Y. Supp.
(65 Hun.) 951 (Sup. Ct. 1892), aff'd 139 N.Y. 643, 35 N.E. 206 (1893); White-
head v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 194 Ore. 106, 239 P.2d 226 (1951). Contra:
Bailey v. Indianapolis Abattoir Co., 66 Ind. App. 465, 118 N.E. 374 (1918);
South Bend & Mishawaka Gas Co. v. Jensen, 182 Ind. 557, 105 N.E. 774
(1914), where only a portion of the amount received was intended to cover
wages.
72 Western & A. R.R. v. Burke, 97 Ga. 560, 25 S.E. 498 (1895); Howard v.
Union Buffalo Mills Co., 122 S.C. 518, 115 S.E. 899 (1922).
73 Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58 (1877); Illinois Cent.
R.R. v. Vaughn, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 111 S.W. 707 (1908).
74 Raynale v. Yellow Cab Co., 115 Cal. App. 90, 300 Pac. 991 (1931); Bliss
v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., 160 Mass. 447, 36 N.E. 65 (1894); Hoban v.
Ryder, 257 Mich. 188, 241 N.W. 241 (1932); Merkel v. Consumers' Power
Co., 220 Mich. 128, 189 N.W. 997 (1922); Yaple v. New York, 0. & W. Ry.,
57 App. Div. 265, 68 N.Y. Supp. 292 (3d Dep't 1901).
75 Bliss v. New York Cent. & H. R.R., supra note 74; Yaple v. New
York, 0. & W. Ry., supra note 74.
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ply to the signing of releases, and that it was possible for a
person to release only a portion of his claim. On the other
hand, in holding that there must be a return of the con-
sideration under these circumstances, a court has said:
To permit her [the plaintiff] to retain the money that
she got under the release, and to also repudiate same,
would allow her to retain the benefits and reject the
burdens. It would allow her to divide or separate the
transaction by accepting the favorable part and rejecting
what was unfavorable to her.7 6
It has also been held that the plaintiff could not "seriously
contend that the settlement and payments referred to in
the instrument . . . had reference to anything other than
her claim for personal injuries. . . ." There the plaintiff
contended that she had been led to believe she had been
paid to compensate for the injuries to her husband's au-
tomobile.
Restoration has been held unnecessary where the plain-
tiff contends that the release was intended to cover only
a portion of his injuries,7 or where it is alleged that the
release was intended to cover only the funeral expenses
and not the damages for the wrongful death of the plain-
tiff's son." The wording in the latter case was as follows:
... [S]uch a release because of the deception practiced
upon the claimant must be construed as a settlement of
those matters only as to which the minds of the parties
met, and may not be considered to be in satisfaction of
anything not consented to by the plaintiff.8 0
It would seem to be broad enough to cover any case of
76 Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jordan, 170 Ala. 530, 54 So.
280, 282 (1911).
77 Drew v. Lyle, 88 Ga. App. 121, 76 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1953).
78 Porth v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 198 Mich. 501, 165 N.W. 698 (1917).
Contra: McCommons v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 171, 184 S.E. 897 (1936);
Wells v. Royer Wheel Co., 114 S.W. 737 (Ky. 1908).
79 Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d 469, 144 P.2d 349 (1944). Contra, Atlanta
& West Point RBR. v. Wise, 54 Ga. App. 666, 188 S.E. 915 (1936).
80 Jordan v. Guerra, 23 Cal. 2d 469, 144 P.2d 349, 352 (1944).
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fraud. Such an analysis would compare with those de-
scribed above, where the courts have said that there was
no contract.
Where the releasor was unaware of the extent of his
injuries when he signed the release, some of the courts
have held that a return of the consideration is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to the action for damages for the re-
mainder of the injury. These cases are decided on the
ground that the release did not cover the remaining in-
juries and that therefore no rescission was necessary."' On
the other hand, where the defendant or his agent fraud-
ulently misrepresented the extent of the plaintiff's in-
juries, other courts have required restoration.82 In Minne-
sota it is held that since a release covers only known in-
juries it can be set aside on the ground of mistake and no
return is necessary.'3 Similarly, the Iowa courts have de-
cided that, since the question is one of mistake, the action
is for reformation of the release rather than rescission and
that consequently, restoration is not necessary.' In Cali-
fornia, Section 1542 of the Civil Code has been interpreted
to mean that the release does not extend to those injuries
which were unknown to the releasor at the time the re-
lease was signed and that therefore neither rescission nor
restoration of the amount received for the release is re-
quired." In each of these situations the courts seem to
81 Cleary v. Brooklyn Bus Corp. 262 App. Div. 896, 28 N.Y.S.2d 908 (2d
Dep't 1941); McCarty v. Houston & T. C. RXR., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 568, 54 S.W.
421 (1899). Contra: Norwood v. Erie R.R., 114 Ind. App. 526, 53 NE.2d 189
(1944); Indianapolis Abattoir Co. v. Bailey, 54 Ind. App. 370, 102 N.E. 970
(1913).
82 Och v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 130 Mo. 27, 31 S.W. 962 (1895); Gilbert v.
Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 19 N.E.2d 785 (1939); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange
v. Bryan, 101 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). Contra, St. Louis & S. F.
R.R. v. Ault, 101 Miss. 341, 58 So. 102 (1912).
83 Serr v. Biwabik Concrete Aggregate Co., 202 Minn. 165, 278 N.W.
355 (1938).
84 Malloy v. Chicago Great Western R.R., 185 Iowa 346, 170 N.W. 481
(1919); Reddington v. Blue & Raferty, 168 Iowa 34, 149 N.W. 933 (1914).
85 Backus v. Sessions, 17 Cal. 2d 380, 110 P.2d 51 (1941); O'Meara v.
Haiden, 204 Cal. 354, 268 Pac. 334 (1928). Section 1542 of the CAL. CrV.
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proceed on the ground that since the amount demanded
is not covered by the contract, no rescission with its ele-
ment of restoration is necessary.
If the basis for requiring restoration is to avoid the un-
just enrichment of the plaintiff, it is difficult to see why
such a requirement should be imposed on a plaintiff in
those cases where the defendant has been guilty of fraud,
and not in those cases where there has been a mistake as
to the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. But even if such a
distinction is warranted it is not certain in these cases that
there has been mistake rather than fraud.
Frequently the consideration for the release is paid di-
rectly to a hospital where the releasor was treated, or to
the doctor who has cared for him. Under these circum-
stances if the release does not mention the amount which
has been paid for his benefit, the releasor may not know
the amount of the consideration. As a result he has not
been compelled to return the consideration prior to his
action, even by those courts which have held that he must
return what has been paid for his benefit when he was
aware of the amount."8 This result has been reached where
the releasor, though unaware of the exact amount, did
know that something was being paid to the doctor or to
the hospital for his benefit.'7 Apparently in these cases it
is immaterial that the plaintiff has not attempted to dis-
cover what amount was paid for his benefit. The fact that
85 continued
CODE (Deering 1949), provides that: "A general release does not extend
to claims which the creditor does not know or suspect to exist in his favor
at the time of executing the release, which if known by him must have
materially affected his settlement with the debtor."
86 Glisson v. Paduca Ry. & Light Co, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 965, 87 S.W. 305
(1905); State ex rel. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Shain, 339
Mo. 903, 98 S.W.2d 597 (1936); McCoy v. James T. McMahon Constr. Co.,
216 S.W. 770 (Mo. 1919); Lucas v. Gibson, 341 Pa. 427, 19 A.2d 395 (1941);
Scanlon v. Pittsburgh Rys., 319 Pa. 477, 181 AtI. 565 (1935); Treadway v.
Union-Buffalo Mills Co., 84 S.C. 41, 65 S.E. 934 (1909). Compare these cases
with those cited in note 118 infra.
87 Peterson v. A. Guthrie & Co., 3 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Wash. 1933);
Colorado City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901).
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he was unaware that anything had been expended for his
benefit would seem to be a valid reason for not requiring a
tender, as would an allegation that he was unable to find
out the amount. Under those circumstances his enrichment
would not seem to be unjust. However, a distinction would
not seem to be warranted solely on the basis that the plain-
tiff does not know what has been paid.
Some courts have said that, since the defendant would
refuse to accept the consideration even if it were tendered
to him, the plaintiff is excused from making such a ten-
der."8 The argument is that the courts will not compel a
person to perform a useless act. It would seem obvious
that in most of these cases the defendant would refuse to
accept such a tender. To accept it would deprive him of
the defense of the release in the action for damages. This
exception, then, would eat up the rule. As an exception
it is valid only if the purpose of the rule is to enable the
defendant to avoid a suit by agreeing to the rescission of
the contract out of court, or if tender, or offer of tender,
is a mere technical element of a rescission. But if the pur-
pose of the requirement is to prevent unjust enrichment,
the willingness of the defendant to accept a tender would
seem to be immaterial. It would be tantamount to saying
that there can be no unjust enrichment to the plaintiff
whenever the defendant refuses to rescind his contract.
The mere fact that the defendant has compromised the
claim is not a concession on his part that the amount is due,
although such statements do sometimes find themselves in
the reported decisions.89 Nevertheless it has been success-
88 Carruth v. Fritch, 210 P.2d 290 (Cal. App. 1949), rev'd, 36 Cal. 2d
426, 224 P.2d 702 (1950); Merril v. Pike, 94 Minn. 186, 102 N.W. 393 (1905);
Franklin v. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 Pac. 819 (1919); Woods v. Wikstrom,
67 Ore. 581, 135 Pac. 192 (1913); Smith v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 232 S.W.
290 (Tex. Com. App. 1921). Contra, Swan v. Great Northern Ry., 40 N.D.
258, 168 N.W. 657 (1918).
89 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Goodholm, 61 Kan. 758, 60 Pac. 1066 (1900);
Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 222 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. App. 1949).
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fully contended that a restoration of the consideration re-
ceived is not required, since it could be credited to what-
ever amount the plaintiff will be entitled on final judg-
ment.9 0 Such decisions are based upon the frequently men-
tioned exception to the rule that the plaintiff need not
restore that, which under any circumstances, he is en-
titled to retain." The reasoning is that if the plaintiff does
not succeed in his action to have the release set aside, then
he is entitled to retain what he received under it since it
is still a valid contract. On the other hand, if he is success-
ful in having the release set aside, he will be entitled to
damages for the tort which has been perpetrated upon
him, and what he has already received can be credited
against such judgment.2 The fallacy of this approach has
been pointed out in several decisions.93 There is no cer-
tainty that the plaintiff, even though successful in having
the release set aside, will be successful in obtaining a
judgment in his tort action, or, that even if he is successful,
that such judgment will be in excess of the amount which
he has already received under the release. The defendant
may have paid the consideration for the release even
though he was confident that he was not liable. Wisdom
may have dictated that he do this rather than litigate the
question of his liability. The difference between these
courts points up that one group is overly concerned with
90 Estes v. Magee, 62 Idaho 82, 109 P.2d 631 (1940); O'Brien v. Chicago,
M. & St. P. Ry., 89 Iowa 644, 57 N.W. 425 (1894); Koshka v. Missouri Pac.
Ry, 114 Kan. 126, 217 Pac. 293 (1923); Whitehead v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 194 Ore. 106, 239 P.2d 226 (1951); Pattison v. Highway Ins.
Underwriters, 278 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
91 RESTATEmE_, RESTrr TION § 65(a) (1936).
92 Carruth v. Fritch, 210 P.2d 290 (Cal. App. 1949), rev'd., 36 Cal. 2d
426, 224 P.2d 702 (1950); O'Brien v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 89 Iowa
644, 57 N.W. 425 (1894).
93 Price v. Connors, 146 Fed. 603 (9th Cir. 1906); Hill v. Northern Pac.
Ry., 113 Fed. 914 (9th Cir. 1902); Louisville & N. R.R. v. McElroy, 100 Ky.
153, 37 S.W. 844 (1896); Smith v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R., 112 Miss. 878, 73
So. 801 (1917); Watson v. Bugg, 280 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1955); Lomax v.
Southwest Missouri Elec. R.R, 119 Mo. App. 192, 95 S.W. 945 (1906).
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the protection of the plaintiff while the other proclaims the
same solicitude for the defendant. Might not the proper
approach be somewhere between?
Even if restoration before suit were required, should
it be required when a jury has already decided that the
plaintiff is entitled to damages in excess of the considera-
tion? Such a decision would obviate the objection that the
plaintiff might be unjustly enriched. Although there may
have been error in the trial court's failure to require resto-
ration under these circumstances, the error would not be
prejudicial. 4 Under these circumstances the plaintiff
would in any event be entitled to retain that which had
been paid to him." If the question of restoration had been
raised earlier in the proceedings, apparently the courts
which have reached this decision would have required that
restoration be madeY6
The principle of these cases is well expressed in Marple
v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry.,97 where it is said:
It is not strictly logical to say that plaintiff was entitled
to retain the money paid because it was due him by
virtue of the original liability, because the question of
defendant's liability was not then determined. But we
are of the opinion, and so hold, that it was not necessary
for plaintiff to do a useless act, that all that is required
by equity is that substantial justice be done, that this is
done when the amount received on the settlement is
credited on the verdict, and that it would be a profitless
proceeding to send this case back for a new trial in order
that defendant may have an opportunity to refuse an
offer of plaintiff to return the money received. The
offer is nothing. It is the actual return of the money
94 Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927);
Bjorkund v. Seattle Elec. Co., 35 Wash. 439, 77 Pac. 727 (1904); Malmstrom
v. Northern Pac. Ry., 20 Wash. 195, 55 Pac. 38 (1898).
95 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 406 (1928).
96 Lion Oil Refining Co. v. Albritton, 21 F.2d 280 (8th Cir. 1927). The
court suggests that if the defendant had raised the question by a demurrer
he would have succeeded.
97 115 Minn. 262, 132 N.W. 333 (1911).
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received that is the- material thing. This has been done
by the verdict. The only contingency that might change
the result would be in case the offer was accepted and
plaintiff failed to recover on his cause of action. But
we cannot conceive of such a result in this case. The
question, therefore, is only a technicality.98
The same result has been reached where no money had
been paid to the plaintiff but where the consideration for
the release was the value of board, lodging, nursing, and
medical attention.99 The court felt that it would be able
to protect the defendant by having the amount of such
expenditures deducted from the verdict.
It is familiar law that an infant who has received prop-
erty under a contract entered into during his infancy, may
disaffirm the contract without returning the property in
those cases where he is unable to return the property."°
At least one court has used this as an analogy in the case
where the releasor has spent the consideration in the be-
lief that it was a gift.'O' Other cases have reached the same
result where the release was procured through the defend-
ant's fraud and the money had been spent before the re-
leasor learned of the fraud and was therefore unable to
return the money at the time of the suit." These cases,
for the most part, emphasize that the money had been
spent for necessities. A court came to this conclusion in a
recent case where it was alleged that $12,500 had been
expended for such necessaries as medical and hospital
98 Id. at 334.
99 The Oriental v. Barclay, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 193, 41 S.W. 117 (1897).
-00 MADDEN, DoMESTIC RELATION S § 215 (1931).
101 Hubbard v. Lusk, 181 S.W. 1028 (Mo. App. 1916).
102 Johnson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 224 Fed. 196 (Wi). Wash. 1915);
Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Towns, 130 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939);
New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 11 S.W.2d 533 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928); Texas & P. Ry. v. Jowers, 110 S.W. 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908); Alli-
son v. Wm. Doerflinger Co., 208 Wis. 206, 242 N.W. 558 (1932). Contra:
Bailey v. Indianapolis Abbatoir Co., 66 Ind. App. 465, 118 N.E. 374 (1918);
Meisel v. Mueller, 261 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. 1953).
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bills, and attorney's fees.1"3 The court stated that the
amount received could be deducted from the judgment
which would be rendered against the defendant in the
damage action. The same result has been reached where
the release was signed at a time when the releasor was
incapable of understanding the nature and effect of his
agreement."
Probably the most significant of these cases is Rase v.
Minneapolis, S. P. & S. S. M. Ry. °5 Here as a result of the
defendant's fraud the plaintiff signed a release in ex-
change for the payment of $2,000, which, with the knowl-
edge of the defendant, he used for the purpose of securing
passage to Norway. Apparently part of the fraudulent in-
tent of the defendant was to encourage him to leave the
country, so that he could not later raise the question of
fraud. When the releasor did return to the United States
and began his action for damages he was unable to return
all of the money he had received. The court rested its de-
cision squarely on the proposition that to require the ten-
der of the money here would be to deny the plaintiff relief
from a deliberately planned fraud. To the objection that
the plaintiff might not succeed in his action for damages
the court said,
... if there is no valid claim, but the defendant was
merely buying peace, or doing an act of humanity for
one injured in its service, or the trial court is mistaken
in the finding that the settlement was inadequate, then,
of course, in such a contingency the expense of the trial
will fall on defendant unjustly. But it appears to us that
this expense to the one found guilty of a deception is not
of sufficient consequence to warrant a court of equity
in denying the defrauded one his day in court. 0 6
103 Pattison v. Highway Ins. Underwriters, 278 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1955).
104 Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 44 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
See also Ipock v. Atlantic & N.C. R.R., 158 N.C. 445, 74 S.E. 352, 354 (1912).
105 118 Minn. 437, 137 N.W. 176 (1912).
1o6 Id. at 178.
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This would seem to be one of the few cases which indi-
cate that the problem is to determine the equities of the
parties and that some consideration should be given to
each of them. The court does say that if the judgment in
the action for damages for personal injuries should be in
favor of the defendant, it should require the plaintiff to
return to the defendant as much of what he had received
as possible. In this case the defendant had encouraged the
spending of the consideration; however, it would not seem
that this was the determining factor. Rather, the court is
concerned with balancing the possibility of depriving the
plaintiff of his cause of action, against the loss the de-
fendant might incur if the plaintiff should not succeed in
his damage action. This is really a determination by the
court that in this case the retention of the consideration
was not "unjust."
On the other hand, Smith v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R. °7
might be cited as a case where the court has found the
equities in favor of the defendant. This was a case of fraud
rather than a case in which the plaintiff was under the in-
fluence of opiates or of pain from his injuries. The amount
of the consideration paid was a large sum ($6,000) as com-
pared with the relatively small sums paid in many of the
cases where restoration was held not to be necessary.
There was no breach of a fiduciary relationship and the
plaintiff had a year in which to think over what had hap-
pened. He also had the opportunity to consult with friends,
relatives and legal counsel before he entered into the re-
lease. The court found that, under these circumstances, it
would not be unfair to require the plaintiff to return what
he had received even though it would operate to deprive
him of his action for damages. It was more important for
the court to insure against the defendant's possible loss
rather than give the plaintiff his cause of action. The
107 312 Miss. 878, 73 So. 801 (1917).
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court's interpretation of the facts and its application of
the law to those facts might be disputed, but the principle
of law adopted would seem to be in harmony with that
of the Rase case.
In determining whether or not restoration ought to be
required, the courts appear to have given more thought
to the surrounding circumstances in cases where the re-
lease is sought to be avoided because of the releasor's in-
competence at the time of signing. Consequently, they have
come up with more consistent results here, than they have
in cases where the releases have been fraudulently pro-
cured. Of course, even here there are examples where the
courts have required restoration simply because it was a
rule or because the release was "voidable" only, and not
"void."' 8 Where the property was still in the possession
of the plaintiff at the time of the action or where there was
no allegation or proof that it had not been spent, the courts
have required the restoration as a condition precedent to
the maintaining of the action." 9 Such a result squares it-
self with the usual approach in handling the disaffirmance
of an infant's contract," and the cause of justice would
not seem to be furthered in allowing the plaintiff to re-
tain the property under these circumstances.
There are decisions holding that, where the plaintiff did
not know what he was signing, because of his incapacity,
there was no contract, and that, since the question of
rescission did not arise, there was no requirement of
restoration prior to the action."'
308 Mahr v. Union Pac. Ry., 170 Fed. 699 (9th Cir. 1909); Johnson v.
Merry Mount Granite Co, 53 Fed. 569 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892); Birmingham Ry.,
Light & Power Co. v. Hinton, 158 Ala. 470, 48 So. 546 (1908); McCary v.
Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 97 W. Va. 306, 125 S.E. 92 (1924).
3o9 Georgia Power Co. v. Moody, 55 Ga. App. 621, 190 S.E. 926 (1937);
Lane v. Dayton Coal & Iron Co., 101 Term. 581, 48 S.W. 1094 (1899). The
latter case involved the question of infancy.
11o MADDLEN, DOMrsTic RELATIONS § 215 (1931).
3-1 Devoe v. Best Motor Co., 27 Ga. App. 619, 109 S.E. 689 (1921), where
the releasor was unable to read or write. Forsythe v. Horspool, 49 S.W.2d
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Courts have held that the requirement of restoration was
dependent upon whether the defendant was aware of the
plaintiff's incapacity at the time the release was signed.'r
Again, such a consideration squares with the usual dis-
tinction made in the disaffirmance of the contracts of in-
competents." 3 In those cases where the releasee was un-
aware of the incompetence, there is greater reason for the
court's concern with the protection of the defendant, than
in those cases where, knowing of the incompetence, the
releasee still attempts to enter into the release. It might be
suggested that the courts could consider as an element in
this determination not only whether the releasee was
aware of the incompetence, but also whether he should
have been aware of it. The equities of his position where
the release is acquired in a hospital room, while the plain-
tiff is still under opiates, would not be nearly as strong as
in the case where it is alleged that the plaintiff was insane.
Such action approaches fraudulent conduct, and the cul-
pability of the defendant does seem to be an element to be
considered in determining whether it would be fair to al-
low the plaintiff to retain the consideration during trial.
A third element the courts have considered in these
cases has been whether the funds received for the release
111 continued
687 (Mo. App. 1932); Edwards v. Morehouse Stave & Mfg. Co., 221 S.W. 744
(Mo. App. 1920), where the releasor was mentally incapacitated. Jones v.
Alabama & V. Ry., 72 Miss. 22, 16 So. 379 (1894); Smallwood v. St. Louis-
San Francisco Ry., 217 Mo. App. 208, 263 S.W. 550 (1924); Michalsky v.
Centennial Brewing Co., 48 Mont. 1, 134 Pac. 307 (1913), where the releasor
was under the influence of drugs and opiates. Genest v. Odell Mfg. Co, 75
N.H. 365, 74 AtI. 593 (1909), where the releasor was suffering from insane
delusions. Burik v. Dundee Woolen Co., 66 N.J.L. 420, 49 Atl. 442 (1901),
where the releasor -Was unacquainted with the language.
M Georgia Power Co. v. Roper, 201 Ga. 760, 41 S.E.2d 226 (1947);
Smallwood v. Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co., 297 Ky. 202, 179 S.W.2d
877 (1944); Carey v. Levy, 329 Mich. 458, 45 N.W.2d 352 (1951); Morris v.
Great Northern Ry., 67 Minn. 74, 69 N.W. 628 (1896); West v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 151 N.C. 231, 65 S.E. 979 (1909).
113 MADDEN, DoMESTIc RELATIONS § 235 (1931).
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were spent during the period of incompetence. 4 In the
cases where the plaintiff has spent the consideration after
he has regained his competence, unless he did so without
being aware of the release, there would seem to be little
reason for not requiring restoration. In fact, in most cases
it would seem that by spending the money after regain-
ing his competence, the plaintiff has affirmed the release.
The courts might well dispose of these cases on that basis,
rather than on the ground that the releasor has not re-
stored that which was received as consideration.
Where the defense to the release is that the releasor was
intoxicated when the release was signed, most of the above
comments would seem to be applicable."* However, an-
other factor may be present. If the defendant has been
instrumental in procuring the plaintiff's intoxication for
the purpose of taking advantage of him, the courts should
not be too concerned with the protection of the defend-
ant."' This is especially true if the plaintiff's loss might
be very great if he is compelled to make restoration be-
fore suit.
In some cases part or all of the consideration paid for
a release may have been paid to someone other than the
releasor. The necessity of the tender of this consideration
or its value presents an additional problem. It would seem
that the enrichment to the plaintiff would be the same
whether he has received the money or the benefits derived
from the money. Factually it would seem to make little
13- Strodder v. Southern Granite Co., 99 Ga. 595, 27 S&E. 174 (1896);
Strodder v. Stone Mountain Granite Co., 94 Ga. 626, 19 S.E. 1022 (1894);
See v. Carbon Block Coal Co., 159 Iowa 413, 138 N.W. 825 (1912); Ipock v.
Atlantic & N. C. R.R., 158 N.C. 445, 74 S.E. 352 (1912); Walker v. Harbison,
283 Pa. 111, 128 Atl. 732 (1925); Arthurs v. Bridgewater Gas Co., 171 Pa.
532, 33 Ati. 88 (1895); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Kelley, 44 S.W.2d 756 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931).
"5 Shaw v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 126 App. Div. 210, 110 N.Y. Supp.
362 (4th Dep't 1908); Stewart v. H. & T. C. Ry., 62 Tex. 246 (1884). In
both cases the money was spent after the releasor became sober.
116 Pawnee Coal Co. v. Royce, 184 fli. 402, 56 N.E. 621 (1900).
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difference whether he received the money from the de-
fendant and used it to pay his doctor and hospital bills,
or whether the defendant paid them directly. Nor would
the fact that a check had been made out to the releasor
and his doctor, as joint payees, seem to be of any im-
portance." However, some courts have held that under
these circumstances, the tender is not required."' Where
the defendant has taken the initiative and has placed the
plaintiff in the hospital at the defendant's expense, and
has hired doctors to care for the plaintiff, prior to the sign-
ing of the release, there may be a reason for creating an
exception to the rule requiring restoration. As one court
has pointed out under these circumstances, "... if appellee
had not asserted a claim for damages on account of his
injuries, appellant would have made no claim against him
for the expense it incurred on his account.""' 9
A similar problem arises where the release has been
signed by one administrator and a successor attempts to
have it set aside. One court has held that the second ad-
ministrator is not required to make a tender where the
money which was paid for the release has not been turned
over to him.' ° The court said that he would have to re-
store the money only if he could obtain it from his prede-
cessor; if he maintained an action against such predecessor
to recover this money, he would in effect be ratifying the
release which he is seeking to avoid.
Another problem arises where the consideration for the
17 Monnier v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 129 N.E.2d 800 (Ind.
App. 1955).
118 Tweeten v. Tacoma Ry. & Power Co., 210 Fed. 828 (9th Cir. 1914);
Colorado City v. Liafe, 28 Colo. 468, 65 Pac. 630 (1901); Fraser v. Glass,
311 111. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941). Contra: Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Turner, 290 Ky. 602, 162 S.W.2d 219 (1942); Poteete v. Moore, 277 Ky. 233,
126 S.W.2d 161 (1939).
119 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Helm, 121 Ky. 645, 89 S.W. 709, 712 (1905).
320 Alabama Co. v. Brown, 207 Ala. 18, 92 So. 490 (1921). Contra: Doten
v. Southern Ry., 32 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Tenn. 1940); Landrum v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 290 Ky. 724, 162 S.W.2d 543 (1942).
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release has been paid by someone other than the defend-
ant. In those cases where the consideration has been paid
by an insurance company, the courts seem to assume that
there should be no reason to reach a result different from
that where the consideration has been paid by the tort-
feasor. At least one court has said that it reached this re-
sult because the insurance company was acting for the
defendant.121 Since, eventually, it will be the insurance
company which will have to pay, or be entitled to the re-
turn of the consideration paid for the release, there would
seem to be little basis for distinguishing these cases.
Where the consideration has been paid from a mutual
benefit fund to an employee the courts have differed in
their results. It has been held that it would be "inequi-
table to permit her (the plaintiff) to retain the money
which the constitution and by-laws of the beneficial so-
ciety provided should be forfeited if she brought suit
against the defendant, or, if received, should be full satis-
faction of all claims and at the same time permit her to
maintain this action."' 22 On the other hand, where the em-
ployer pays the consideration from a mutual benefit fund,
he pays it as a trustee of the fund. Since the suit for the
tort is brought against him in his individual capacity, and
not as a trustee of the fund, it has been held that the
amount received from the fund need not be returned as a
condition precedent to the action against the employer.'
Although the plaintiff was not required to tender a return
to the defendant prior to the bringing of the suit, the con-
sideration must be credited on whatever judgment the
plaintiff might recover.' If the consideration has been
paid from the fund as an independent obligation, and not
121 Brown v. Walker Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 161, 122 S.E. 670 (1924).
Contra, Reed v. John Gill & Sons Co., 201 Mo. App. 457, 212 S.W. 43 (1918).
122 Drobney v. Lukens Iron & Steel Co., 204 Fed. 11, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1913).
-23 O'Neil v. Lake Superior Iron Co., 63 Mich. 690, 30 N.W. 688 (1886).
124 King v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 157 N.C. 44, 72 S.E. 801 (1911).
[Vol. X=X
1956] ., THE REQUIREMENT OF RESTORATION
as a discharge of the employer's liability for the tort, a re-
turn of the consideration should not be required under
any circumstances. The plaintiff would not be unjustly
enriched by retaining the money. If this is the situation,
however, there is no reason for crediting the amount re-
ceived to the judgment against the employer. On the other
hand, if the amount is received from those funds as a dis-
charge of the employer's tort liability, there would seem
to be no basis for distinguishing this situation from that
where the consideration has been paid by an insurance
company.
A similar problem arises where the money has been
paid by one person and it becomes necessary to avoid
the release in order to sue his joint tortfeasor. One court
has held that, under such circumstances, a tender is not
required, since the person who contributed the considera-
tion is not a party to the suit and there is no intention to
sue such person.' Such a reason would be sound if the
purpose of requiring the tender is to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the defend-
ant to the action. However, if we are concerned with fair-
ness of his retention under all circumstances, the fact that
the consideration had been paid by another would be only
another factor to take into consideration. It has also been
held that a tender is required in these cases," but that a
tender into court where the releasee was not a party to
the action would not be effective. The court there relied
upon the fact that an action could not be brought until the
release was avoided and that the release remained in ef-
fect until there was a rescission, one of whose elements
was the return of the consideration. Where the releasee
is not a party to the action, an offer to credit the judgment
125 Yellow Cab Co. v. Bradin, 172 Md. 388, 191 AtI. 717 (1937).
126 Morris v. Great Northern Ry., 67 Minn. 74, 69 N.W. 628 (1896).
327 McNamara v. Eastman Kodak Co., 232 N.Y. 18, 133 N.E. 113 (1921).
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with the amount received is likewise ineffective. 2 In one
case the defendant misrepresented to the plaintiff that he
was being paid what was due him from a burial fund. 2 9
In spite of the fact that this amount was owed by a third
party, the court held that its repayment was a condition
precedent to an action against the tortfeasor.
In almost every case it is the releasor who is challeng-
ing the validity of the release. However, it is possible for
the releasee to wish to avoid the release. In one such case,
an insurance company sought to use the fraud of the re-
leasor as a defense to an action on the release.3 The court
was of the opinion that before the insurance company
could use the defense, it must have restored the injured
party to the position he occupied prior to the release. In
this case that meant the insurance company would have
had to return to the releasor his cause of action for per-
sonal injuries. This the insurance company was unable to
do. Here too, then, the defrauded party was denied relief,
unless a deceit action would have been available and prac-
tical under these circumstances.
The usual statement is that the party relying on the re-
lease must in some way raise the question of the lack of
tender.' This usually has been done by answer, demurrer,
reply, and motion. One case has held that a general denial
to the plea of a release cannot be attacked for its failure to
allege a restoration of the consideration received. 32 The
court said that under the general denial the plaintiff might
128 Meisel v. Mueller, 261 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1953).
129 Hubbard's Adm'x v. Louisville & N. R.R., 267 Ky. 435, 102 S.W.2d
343 (1937).
130 Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Dooley, 68 Ga. App. 230, 22 S.E.2d
625 (1942).
'31 Mandeville v. Jacobson, 122 Conn. 429, 189 Ati. 596 (1937); Robertson
v. George A. Fuller Constr. Co., 115 Mo. App. 465, 92 S.W. 130 (1905);
Ambellan v. Barcalo Mfg. Co., 118 App. Div. 547, 102 N.Y. Supp. 993 (4th
Dep't 1907); McDowell v. Southern Ry., 113 S.C. 399, 102 S.E. 639 (1920);
Doyle v. Teasdale, 263 Wis. 328, 57 N.W.2d 381 (1953).
132 Baird v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 39 Cal. App. 512, 179 Pac. 449 (1919).
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be able to show facts which would indicate that the return
of the consideration was not necessary in his case. Such re-
sult would seem proper where the releasor denies having
executed a release, but it is doubtful if it would be appli-
cable in those cases where he admits having signed the re-
lease but denies its validity. It has also been held that
where there is no request for an instruction to that effect,
the defendant cannot complain that the jury did not de-
duct the amount of the release from the verdict.'33 The
court presumed that the jury had made the deduction.
Where the courts require the tender of the money re-
ceived, the time of that tender tells much of the court's
attitude toward such a requirement and something of the
reasons for the requirement. If it is required as an element
of a rescission, it would seem that in most of the cases the
tender should be made prior to the bringing of the suit.3
However, the decisions do not bear this out. In some of the
cases where the court says that there must be a tender be-
fore the commencement of the suit, the reason seems to be
that if there is not a tender within a reasonable time after
the discovery of the fraud, then there has been an affirm-
ance of the release. 35
It has been held that a tender, concurrent with the filing
of the petition' or prior to the defendant's filing his
plea, 37 is sufficient, and that the tender is in time if it is
made when the defendant first raises the release as a de-
fense.3 On the other hand, it has been held that the tender
133 Robinson v. Missouri Pac. Transp. Co., 192 Ark. 593, 93 S.W.2d 311
(1936).
134 Gilbert v. Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 19 N.E.2d 785 (1939).
'135 Roberts v. Southern Ry., 73 Ga. App. 759, 38 S.E.2d 48 (1946);
Butler v. Gleason, 214 Mass. 248, 101 N.E. 371 (1913); Brown v. Walker
Lumber Co., 128 S.C. 161, 122 S.E. 670 (1924).
-36 Gattis v. Louisville & N. R.R., 182 Ga. 686, 186 S.E. 730 (1936).
137 Weiser v. Welch, 112 Mich. 134, 70 N.W. 438 (1897).
138 McGregor v. Mills, 280 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1955), in the reply; Toppass
v. Perkins' Adz'x, 268 Ky. 186, 104 S.W.2d 423 (1937), in the reply; Broad-
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must be made when the releasor or his attorney first be-
comes aware of the release.'3 9 This may be prior to the
time of beginning the suit, as it was in Harrison v. South-
ern Ry.'40 Or, they may first become aware of the release
at the time of the answer, in which case the tender must be
pleaded in reply. It would seem possible that the awareness
of the issue could also come at some later time. If the
plaintiff may begin an action at law upon the supposition
that there has been a rescission, he should not be required
to anticipate that the defendant will raise the release as a
defense. It has been said:
The settlement may be offered as a defense or it may not.
If a party believes it to have been obtained by fraud
or there is other vice inherent in the contract, and,
therefore, is of no effect, it seems unnecessary that he
should anticipate that the other party will rely on it. The
initiative should come from him.' 4 '
This is only another way of stating what has been said
above, that restoration of what has been received is a re-
quirement but that its absence must be pleaded by the de-
fendant. However, if the rescission must have been ac-
complished before the suit is brought, it would seem too
late to do the rescinding when the question is first raised
after the suit has begun. Of course, if the action were in a
138 continued
way Coal-Mining Co. v. Ortkies, 200 Ky. 8, 254 S.W. 434 (1923), in the
reply; Watson v. Bugg, 280 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1955), prior to the amended
petition after the plea; Gibson County Elec. Membership Corp. v. Hall,
32 Tenn. App. 394, 222 S.W.2d 689 (1947), in the reply; Memphis St. Ry. v.
Giardino, 116 Tenn. 368, 92 S.W. 855 (1906), at the time of the introduction
of the evidence was too late where the question was raised in the answer;
Carroll v. Fetty, 121 W. Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 571
(1939), in a reply which was filed with the consent of counsel after im-
panelling the jury-the parties had not consented to a tender at that time.
-39 Birmingham Ry., Light & Power Co. v. Jordan, 170 Ala. 530, 54 So.
280 (1911); Harrison v. Southern Ry., 131 S.C. 12, 127 S.E. 270 (1925).
140 131 S.C. 12, 127 S.E. 270 (1925).
'4' Toppass v. Perkins' Adm'x, 268 Ky. 186, 104 S.W.2d 423, 427, 428
(1937).
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court of equity, an allegation that the plaintiff was willing
to restore the defendant to his proper position may be
timely when the question is first raised by the defendant.
But, under these circumstances, a tender of the consider-
ation received usually is not required. 42 The requirement
of the tender at various times in the pleadings is consistent
with the approach that the purpose is to prevent the plain-
tiff's unjust enrichment. The plaintiff should be required
to act when it becomes apparent that he will be unjustly
enriched. This analysis would be especially applicable
where the tender of the consideration has been permitted
during trial' 3 The unjust enrichment of the plaintiff could
be prevented even as late as the closing argument.'I
Courts have held that tender during the suit has been
too late because there has been a ratification of the con-
tract.'45 Others have said that the plaintiff should not be
allowed to sit by and speculate on the result of the action. 46
They have also used the standard statement that since re-
scission must be accomplished before the suit, tender of
restoration is too late when it is attempted during the
trial.'4 To require a tender before suit in a personal injury
action, places an exceptionally great burden upon the coun-
sel for the plaintiff. He could never be certain that his client
had not released his cause of action. If he first learned of
the release after the action had been brought, it would be
342 See note 10 supra.
143 Hollinquest v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 88 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La.
1950), after overruling his contention that a tender was not necessary,
the court permitted the plaintiff to amend during the trial; Smith v. In-
habitants of Holyoke, 112 Mass. 517 (1873), tender during defendant's
argument to the jury was timely; Roberts v. Central Lead Co., 95 Mo.
App. 581, 69 S.W. 630 (1902), after overruling the demurrer to the amended
petition, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay the amount into court.
3-44 Smith v. Inhabitants of Holyoke, supra note 143.
145 Roggenkamp v. Marks, 299 Ill. App. 209, 19 N.E2d 828 (1939).
146 Kelly v. Louisville & N. HR., 154 Ala. 573, 45 So. 906 (1908).
'47 Western & A. RH. v. Atkins, 141 Ga. 743, 82 S.E. 139 (1914); Randall
v. Port Huron, St. C. & M. C. Ry., 215 Mich. 413, 184 N.W. 435 (1921).
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too late for him to avoid it even if it were otherwise pos-
sible. In those cases where he is aware of the release, he
may not be able to determine its extent or effect prior to
trial. And such elements may be important in determining
the necessity of tender, especially in those cases where the
courts distinguish between "void" and "voidable" releases.
While the courts have talked much about the necessity
of restoration in these cases it is surprising how seldom the
question has arisen as to just what act satisfies the require-
ment. In some cases it seems to be assumed that it is suf-
ficient for the releasor to state his willingness to restore
what he has received. 4 ' According to the American Law
Institute it is an "offer" to restore which is required.'49 On
the other hand, the decisions of some of the courts seem to
require a technical tender of the amount. 5 ' Or, a tender
into court may satisfy the requirement. 5 The equity re-
quirement of a statement of willingness to allow the amount
to be credited against the judgment has been held to sat-
isfy the rule. 52
The question also arises as to what the releasor must do
after a tender has been made and has been refused. If the
purpose of the requirement is to prevent unjust enrich-
ment of the releasor and to protect the releasee, it would
seem that, after such a refusal, the releasor still could not
use the money for his own purposes. Such an attitude has
been expressed by the statement that the tender must be
continuous during the trial and that the releasor must con-
148 St. Louis & S. F. R.R. v. McCrory, 2 Ala. App. 531, 56 So. 822 (1911).
149 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 480 (1932); RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 65
(1937).
150 Niederbauser v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 131 Mich. 550, 91 N.W.
1028 (1902); Reid v. St. Louis & S. F. R.R., 187 S.W. 15 (Mo. 1916); Gilbert
v. Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 19 N.E.2d 785 (1939); McNamara v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 232 N.Y. 18, 133 N.E. 113 (1921).
151 Interstate Coal Co. v. Trivett, 155 Ky. 825, 160 S.W. 728 (1913).
152 Poe v. Texas & P. Ry., 95 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936), rev'd
on other grounds, 131 Tex. 337, 115 S.W.2d 591 (1938); Galveston, H. & S. A.
Ry. v. Cade, 93 S.W. 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906). -
[Vol. XXXI
THE REQUIREMENT OF RESTORATION
tinually hold himself open to make a tender, if the releasee
chooses to rescind. 3 He may not spend the money as
though it were his own,' or refuse to return the money
during trial, if the releasee signifies his desire to have it at
that time." It would seem to follow that the reasonable
thing to do under these circumstances would be to require a
tender of the money, or a substitute, into court. However, it
has been indicated that this is not necessary and that the
court can protect the defendant by crediting the judgment
with the amount received. 5 Indeed, one court has gone
so far as to suggest that after a refusal of tender by the de-
fendant, the plaintiff is at liberty to use the money for his
own purposes.' And this result is reached even though
the plaintiff has admitted that he had received it as con-
sideration for the release which he is trying to avoid. Such
results are valid only if the requirement of tender is merely
technical. If the actual purpose is to prevent the unjust
enrichment of the plaintiff, something more than a mere
tender or offer to tender should be required. Seldom will
the defendant accept the tender, and, unless the refusal
makes the retention of possession less unjust, the court
would still have the problem of preventing the enrichment.
III
THE IMPACT OF STATUTES ON THE RULE
Section five of the Federal Employers' Liability Act"'5
provides that:
13 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 67(2) (1937).
154 Glover v. Louisville & N. R.R., 163 Tenn. 85, 40 S.W.2d 1031 (1931).
155 Aurand v. Toledo & 0. C. Ry., 21 Ohio App. 390, 153 N.E. 212 (1926).
156 Vandervelden v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 61 Fed. 54 (C.C.N.D. Iowa
1894) ; Beatty v. Palmer, 196 Ala. 67, 71 So. 422 (1916) ; International & G. N.
R.R. v. Shuford, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 251, 81 S.W. 1189 (1904).
357 The Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Dunham, 30 Mich. 128 (1874).
158 35 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 55 (1952).
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Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever,
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void:
Provided, That in any action brought against such com-
mon carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions
of this chapter, such common carrier may set off therein
any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance,
relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to
the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on
account of the injury or death for which such action was
brought.
In Duncan v. Thompson,'59 $600 was paid to the plaintiff
for living and other expenses pending negotiations for the
settlement of whatever claim he may have had. In return
for the $600 the plaintiff promised:
.. I agree with said Trustee that I will endeavor, in good
faith, to adjust and settle any claim I may have for my
injuries without resorting to litigation, but I agree that
if my claim is not so adjusted, and I elect to bring suit,
I will first return the said sum of $600 to said Trustee
and said return shall be a prerequisite to the filing and
maintenance of any such suit.'6 0
The Court held that this was not a compromise and settle-
ment and that the agreement to return the $600 prior to
the bringing of the suit was void under the provisions of
section five of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The
creation of the condition of returning the consideration was
a device to enable the carrier to relieve itself from liability
under the act. The Court did not determine what effect
a valid compromise and settlement would have had un-
der the statute.
In Irish v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc.,' the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was faced with a fraudu-
lently acquired release of a claim which was cognizable
159 315 U.S. 1 (1942).
160 Id. at 3.
161 164 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1947).
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under the act. The court held that the release was void
and that, because of section five of the act, there could be
no requirement of restoration as a condition to the bring-
ing of an action under the act.
[I]f this release were obtained fraudulently by the
appellee, it was within the broad scope of the phrase
"any... device whatsoever," in Sec. 5 and consequently
void. It follows that the plaintiff was free to attack its
validity without restitution. 62
The Illinois court has reached this same result under the
proviso of the act." 3 Since the statute provides that where
the consideration had been paid, the carrier may reduce
the amount of the verdict by the sum which already had
been paid, there is the implication that the plaintiff need
not return the consideration as a condition to his bringing
an action under the act.
Neither the Irish case nor the Duncan case decided that
every release was a violation of the act as an attempt by
the carrier to "exempt itself from any liability." That
issue was decided in 1948 when the Supreme Court in
Callen v. Pennslyvania R.R.,' said that a release was not
a device whereby the carrier exempted itself from liability
but was a method of recognizing the possibility of its liabil-
ity. In Collett v. Louisville & N. R.R.,' 63 a district court
suggested that a different result would have been reached
in the Irish case had it been decided after the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in the Callen case. However, in the
Irish case the court expressly stated that it was not con-
cerned with the question of a valid release.
The court in the Collett case was also of the opinion that
since the fraud was denied by the carrier, the decision in
the Irish case was wrong in holding that the requirement
162 Id. at 840.
163 Johnson v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry., 338 IM. App. 316, 87 N.E.2d 567 (1949).
164 332 U.S. 625 (1948).
16' 81 F.Supp. 428 (E.D. I. 1948).
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for the return of the consideration was a "device" to limit
the liability of the carrier. The court said:
It compels the court, upon the bare allegation of fraud
by plaintiff, to ignore the denial of fraud by the carrier
and to assume such fraud in the release as will constitute
it a device by the carrier to exempt itself from lia-
bility.166
The Irish case would seem to have merit in that a carrier
by procuring a release through fraud could escape the pro-
visions of the act in those cases where it would be diffi-
cult or impossible for the releasor to return the money.
To this extent then it would seem that the Irish case is in
conformity with the spirit of the act.
In the Collett case the court also tried to make the fur-
ther distinction, that the consideration ($1,500) paid for
the release in the Irish case was only nominal, whereas the
payment of $8,000 in the Collet case was a substantial one.
Although the contention may be made that the inadequacy
of the consideration paid is evidence of an attempt by
the carrier to exempt itself from liability, such an argu-
ment does not seem valid in either of the two cases.
In two cases arising under the act, it has been held that
the consideration received for the release must be returned
before the action can be brought on the original claim.'67
However, the decision in the Irish case has been followed
in two other cases. 6 s It has also been held that the restora-
tion of consideration is unnecessary under the Arizona
Employers' Liability Act which has a section identical with
that of section five of the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.' 69
166 Id. at 431-432.
167 Graham v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949);
Collett v. Louisville & N. R.R., 81 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. 111. 1948).
168 Marshall v. New York Cent. R.R., 218 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1955);
Humphrey v. Erie R.R., 116 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
169 ARiz. CODE ANN. § 56-806 (1939); Miles v. Lavender, 10 F.2d 450 (9th
Cir. 1926).
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But whether the federal courts follow the Irish case or
not, their decisions on the requirement of restoration in
cases arising under the act may also be important in the
state courts. It had been held that it was a question of
state law whether restoration was necessary in order to
set aside a release of a claim covered by the act.' Other
courts have assumed it to be a question of state law."
This was the decision of the Ohio court in 1951 when it
held that the effect of such a release should be determined
by Ohio courts according to Ohio law.'72 This decision was
reversed by the United States Supreme Court in a memo-
randum decision in 1952.' In reaching this conclusion
the Supreme Court relied upon Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.
R.R.,' 74 which held that federal law should be used to
determine the validity of a release of a claim covered by
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It is interesting to
note that the effect of the Supreme Court's reversal was
to reinstate the decision of the Ohio Court of Appeals. This
court had applied the "more lenient" rule of the federal
courts and had cited the Irish case with approval.'75 Thus,
federal law, whatever it may be, controls the requirement
of restoration in actions brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act.
The Workmen's Compensation Acts also have had an
impact upon the doctrine. Elsewhere in this discussion
cases have been cited which involved the releases of claims
under such acts.' 6 In none of them, however, did it ap-
170 Central of Georgia Ry. v. Hoban, 24 Ga. App. 686, 102 S.E. 46 (1920).
171 Graham v. Atchison T. & S. F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1949);
Allison v. Chicago Great Western Ry., 240 Minn. 547, 62 N.W.2d 374 (1954).
172 Squire' v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 155 Ohio St. 201, 98 N.E.2d 313
(1951).
173 Squire v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 342 U.S. 935 (1952).
174- 342 'U.S. 359 (1952). -
175 Squire v. Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry., 91 Ohio App. 507, 108 N.E.2d 846
(1950).
176 E.g., Trokey v. United States Cartridge Co., 222 S.W2d 496 (Mo. App.
1949); Traders'& General Ins. Co. v. Towns, 130 :S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ.
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pear that the court reached its conclusion because of the
statute. There are some decisions, however, whose results
have been determined by the statutes. Since each deter-
muination depends upon the interpretation of the statute
involved, no detailed analysis will be attempted here.
However, several decisions will be cited to show what
effect these statutes might have on the doctrine.
Frequently the Workmen's Compensation Acts have
provisions which require that before a settlement of a
claim will be recognized it must be approved by a court
or by a board. The Kentucky courts have said that, under
such provisions, any settlement which had not been ap-
proved by the board was void. As a result, repayment of
the consideration received was not a condition to an action
under the act. 77 And a Louisiana court has held that re-
payment need not be made under such circumstances since
to require it would thwart the purpose of the act.' 8 Since
the money received under such an agreement is likely to
have been spent by the workman or his family for hospital
or medical bills or for living expenses, to require the re-
turn of the money would deny him the relief the act
sought to secure for him. In interpreting its statute the
New Hampshire court has said that the rule requiring an
infant to restore what he has received, as a condition to
his rescission of a contract, did not apply to benefits he had
received as a result of his mother's unauthorized compen-
sation agreement. 7" Insofar as the payment discharged
176 continued
App. 1939); Casualty Reciprocal Exchange v. Bryan, 101 S.W.2d 895 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937); Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Sterling, 51 S.W2d 788 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Harrington, 11 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
177 Ky. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §§ 342.050, 342.265 (Baldwin 1955); Hatfield v.
Billiter & Wiley, 231 Ky. 736, 22 S.W.2d 129 (1929); Stewart v. Model Coal
Co., 216 Ky. 742, 288 S.W. 696 (1926).
178 LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1033 (1950); Neyland v. Maryland Cas. Co., 28 So. -
2d 351 (La. App. 1946).
1'9 Roberts v. Hillsborough Mills, 85 N.H. 517, 161 Af 29 (1932).
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the defendant's common law liability, it was a statutory
.and not a contractual bar. Therefore, the infant had no
contract to rescind and the rule requiring restoration did
not apply.
A New York statute makes it a misdemeanor to enter
a hospital for the purpose of procuring a release within
fifteen days of the time the injuries had been sustained."s
A court has held that although the violation of this statute
does not render the release void, a tender of the amount
received is not a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right
to sue for his injuries.' However, it is not certain whether
the result was reached because of the statute or because
of the precedent of other New York cases.'
These few statutes would seem to indicate a willingness
on the part of the courts to abandon the strict require-
ment of restoration where the statutes offer them the
slightest opportunity to do so. The reason assigned may
be that the contract is void or that rescission is not neces-
sary. However, the fact that a continuance of the rule
might thwart the purpose of the statute, or that its appli-
-cation is not needed to protect the defendant, would seem
to be the better basis for such decisions.
One legislature has taken steps to abandon the require-
ment of restoration as a condition precedent to the rescis-
sion of a contract. A 1952 amendment to the New York
,Civil Practice Act provides that:
A party who has received benefits by reason of a
transaction that is void or voidable because of fraud,
.80 N. Y. PEN. LAW § 270-b.
181 Thorne v. Columbia Cab Corp., 167 Misc. 72, 3 N.Y.S2d 537 (City Ct.
1938), rev'd on other grounds, 168 Misc. 255, 5 N.Y.S.2d 775 (Sup. Ct. 1938),
the latter case affirmed in 256 App. Div. 906, 10 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1st Dep't
1939).
182 The court cites with approval Scully v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co.,
155 App. Div. 382, 140 N.Y. Supp. 260 (2d Dep't 1913); Herman v. P. H. Fitz-
gibbons Boiler Co., 136 App. Div. 286, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1074 (4th Dep't 1910);




misrepresentation, mistake, duress, infancy or incom-
petency, and who, in an action or proceeding or by way
of defense or counterclaim, seeks rescission, restitution
... or other relief, whether formerly denominated legal
or equitable, dependent upon a determination that such
transaction was void or voidable, shall not be denied
relief because of a failure to tender before judgment
restoration of such benefits; but the court may make a
tender of restoration a condition of its judgment. .... 1s3
This statute has been applied to the release cases.' And
this is in a state which had applied the requirement of
restoration more rigorously than most."
Under the statute, it is left to the court's discretion
whether or not restoration is made a condition to judg-
ment. An example of the exercise of this discretion can
be found in the following order of an inferior New York
court:
As a condition of setting aside the waiver, the Court
directs petitioner to restore to the estate any and all the
benefits already paid to her .... In the event that she
is presently unable to restore the payments already
made to her under said policies, petitioner will file a
duly acknowledged consent authorizing the executors
to charge her distributive share with such sums.18 6
It should be noted that the statute, as it was originally en-
acted in 1946, retained the distinction between "void" and
"voidable" contracts. Prior to the enactment of the statute
the New York courts held that restoration was not re-
383 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. ACT § 112-g.
Is" Ciletti v. Union Pac. R.R., 196 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1952); Shontell v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 282 App. Div. 965, 125 N.Y.S.2d 911 (2d Dep't 1953);
Ploof v. Somers, 282 App. Div. 798, 123 N.Y.S.2d 5 (3d Dep't 1953).
185 E.g., Gilbert v. Rothschild, 280 N.Y. 66, 19 N.E.2d 785 (1939). For a
comprehensive treatment of the New York cases see the study made by
Professor Patterson for the New York Law Revision Commission. LAw
REvIsio" CommissioN, LEGISLATIVE DOCUENT No. 65(B) (1946).
186 In re Lieberman's Will, 206 Misc. 263, 132 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (Surr. Ct.
1954). The case did not involve the release of a tort claim.
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quired where the contract was "void."' 87 Thus, it was felt
that it was not necessary to provide for "void" contracts in
the statute.' s Such a distinction carried into the statute
was likely to encourage other differences in the handling of
these cases. For example, where the contract was "void"
there was no express provision for the court's discretionary
power to require restoration as a condition to a judgment.
Thus, the courts were invited to distinguish between the
cases on that ground. There was no good reason for not
making the statute applicable to both "void" and "void-
able" contracts, even though the former were already
covered by judicial decisions. It is fortunate that this dis-
tinction was removed by the 1952 amendment.
It should also be noted that the statute does not expressly
authorize the court to require restoration prior to or dur-
ing the trial if it should deem it necessary. Although the
need for it may arise in very few cases, it would seem de-
sirable that the courts also be given discretionary power
in this area. The fact that the statute is applicable to the
avoiding of contracts of all kinds is even more reason for
expressly giving the courts more discretion.
IV
DAMAGES FOR DECEIT AS AN ALTERNATIVE
REMEDY
In those cases, where the release was procured by fraud,
it has usually been asserted without opposition, that, in-
stead of an action involving a rescission of the release and
187 Cleary v. Brooklyn Bus Corp. 262 App. Div. 896, 28 N.Y.S.2d 908 (2d
Dep't 1941); Scully v. Brooklyn Heights R.R., 155 App. Div. 382, 140 N.Y.
Supp. 260 (2d Dep't 1913); Herman v. P. H. Fitzgibbons Boiler Co., 136 App.
Div. 286, 120 N.Y. Supp. 1074 (4th Dep't 1910).




a suit on the original cause of action, the releasor has the
option of affirming the release and bringing suit for the
damages he has sustained because of the fraud." 9 In such
event he is not required to restore what he has received
under the release.9 ° The existence of such a remedy is
frequently given as a reason for the strict application of
the rule requiring restoration where the action is based
upon rescission.' Therefore, it behooves us to look to the
appropriateness of the deceit action in these cases.
The major question confronting us in a deceit action is
the proof and measure of damages. It has been said that
there are two rules which have been adopted in measur-
ing damages for deceit:
(1) The federal rule, followed in a few states, allows
the person defrauded to recover the difference between
the value of what the plaintiff has parted with and the
value of what he has received in the transaction; (2) the
majority rule, following the analogy of the measure in
actions in contract for breach of warranty, allows re-
covery of the difference between the actual value of
what the plaintiff received and the value which it would
have had if it had been as represented. The first may be
termed the "out-of-pocket loss" rule, and the second, the
"loss of bargain" rule.19 2
However applicable these rules may be in sales contracts,
it would seem that the "majority" or "loss of bargain"
rule would be difficult to apply in the release cases. And
in the application of the "out-of-pocket loss" rule we are
confronted with the problem of determining "the value of
what the plaintiff has parted with."
In Gould v. Cayuga County Nat'l Bank,"3 the court was
189 E.g., Gould v. Cayuga County Nat'l Bank, 86 N.Y. 75 (1881), a case
which does not involve the release of a tort claim but is frequently cited
as authority in such cases; Swan v. Great Northern Ry., 40 N.D. 258, 168
N.W. 657 (1918).
190 5 WnmISTON, Coxim.AcTs § 1524 (Rev. ed. 1937).
'91 E.g., Gould v. Cayuga County Natl Bank, 86 N.Y. 75 (1881).
192 McCoRmicK, DAMAGES § 121 (1935).
19 86 N.Y. 75 (1881).
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concerned with the release of a contract claim. However,
the case is frequently cited as authority for the proposition
that a restoration of the consideration received for a re-
lease is a condition precedent to an action at law for dam-
ages for personal injuries. In that case the court suggests
a deceit action as an alternative to rescission. The court
then points out that, in an action for deceit, the damages
would be measured by the difference between what the
plaintiff settled for and what he would have been willing
to settle for had there been no misrepresentation. The
court expressly excludes the damages which might have
been recovered for the released claim as an element in
the proof of the damages for the deceit. In a second ac-
tion,' arising out of this dispute, the plaintiff did sue for
damages for the deceit. There it was said:
... [A]ssuming that the parties meant to avoid litigation
and compromise their dispute, and that nothing but facts
were disclosed, how much could Gould have reasonably
demanded and the defendants have reasonably allowed
as a final compromise above and beyond the $25,000 in
fact allowed and received? That is the question of
damages for the jury. It respects the fair value of the
disputed claim as the subject of a reasonable and just
compromise, or of a reasonable sale by the creditor to the
debtor. It is the excess of that value upon the true state
of facts as known, or honestly believed, over the value
fixed upon a false state of facts fraudulently asserted,
which constitutes the plaintiff's actual loss from the
fraud.'9 5
It would seem at once that the measure of such damages
would be difficult to prove. In fact it has been said that in
such a case the damages are too speculative and will not
be recognized." In Whitman v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 9'
194 Gould v. Cayuga Co. Bank, 99 N.Y. 333, 2 N.E. 16 (1885).
395 Id. at 19.
196 Taylor v. Hopper, 207 Cal. 102, 276 Pac. 990 (1929); Whitman v. Sea-
board Air Line.Ry, 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861 (1917). Contra: Kordis v.
Auto Owners Ins. Co., 311 Mich. 247, 18 N.W.2d 811 (1945); Desmaris v.
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the lower court instructed the jury that they were to use
their own estimate of what damages the plaintiff would
have recovered in an action for the injuries. The appellate
court felt that this allowed the jury a "substitution of
their independent judgment for that of an unknown and
unknowable jury" and that therefore, the damages were
too speculative.9 In this case, it was proof of the prospec-
tive damages for personal injuries which made the dam-
ages in the deceit action speculative. It would seem that
the damages in a deceit action would be even more specu-
lative if the court refuses to permit proof of the elements
of the action for personal injuries. A ruling that the dam-
ages are too speculative in these cases precludes any action
for deceit and the plaintiff is left with only his action for
rescission of the release.
If the measure of damages as outlined in the Gould
cases is followed, there is still the problem of the ad-
missibility of evidence of the defendant's liability for the
personal injuries. It has been pointed out that it is not
necessary for the plaintiff to establish that he had a valid
claim for personal injuries. 9 All that is necessary is to
establish that he had a disputed claim which would be
196 continued
People's Gaslight Co., 79 N.H. 195, 107 Atl. 491 (1919). In both the Whitman
and the Desmaris cases, the action was brought in deceit in order to avoid
the statute of limitations which barred the action on the original tort.
3.9 107 S.C. 200, 92 S.E. 861 (1917).
398 Id. at 862.
-99 Urtz v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 137 App. Div. 404, 121 N.Y. Supp.
879 (4th Dep't 1910). Compare the dissenting opinion in Inman v. Merchants
Mut. Cas. Co., 274 App. Div. 320, 83 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (3d Dep't 1948):
"Fraud will not sustain a recovery unless accompanied by dam-
age or injury....
"The disposition of this litigation requires a separate trial as to
the ... loss in advance of the trial for fraud .... Until a judgment
for damages on account of the negligence . . . has been obtained,
no cause of action exists for fraud, as there is no proof of damage.
"A trial of the negligence issue against the insurer will violate
rules of evidence of long standing, as proof that a claimed
negligent driver is insured has led to the reversal of many
judgments."
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the subject of a compromise. However, it follows that the
stronger his claim, the more valuable would be the con-
sideration he surrendered when he signed the release.
The greater the damages he could have recovered, the
more the plaintiff would have demanded as consideration
for his release. Consequently, his damages in the deceit
action would be greater. Thus, it would seem that proof
of the damages, which he might have obtained in an ac-
tion on the original tort, should be admissible as an ele-
ment of the plaintiff's proof of the value of the claim which
he had released.
In a recent Ohio case the plaintiff refused to tender the
consideration received for the release and contended in
his amended petition that he was asking only for damages
for the fraud.00 The court refused to accept that conten-
tion, saying:
... [a] study of his amended petition discloses specifica-
tions of negligence and allegations as to personal injuries,
pain, suffering and loss of wages resulting therefrom.
Hence, although the plaintiff has injected the matter of
fraud, the original basic elements of his case-negligence,
injury and proximate cause-remain unchanged, and
there seems to be no persuasive reason for the applica-
tion of a different rule. The simple addition of the claim
of fraud cannot be regarded as a bit of legerdemain by
which the plaintiff somehow has eliminated any of
the original elements of negligence, injury and proximate
cause. Should he fail in his proof as to either negligence
or proximate cause, he obviously cannot recover even
though there may have been misrepresentation as to the
nature and extent of his injuries.20 1
This statement discloses the court's misconception of the
action of deceit and the purpose of alleging and proving
the elements of the original cause of action. But it is indica-
tive of the fact that there may be no alternative to the ac-
200 Picklesimer v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214
(1949).
201 Id. at 217.
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ti6n of rescission in the case of a fraudulently acquired
release. In pleading the original action, there is a danger
of confusing the damages of that action with the dam-
ages which should be recoverable in the action for de-
ceit. It is as a result of this error that some courts have
said that the pleadings and instructions given were appro-
priate in an action for personal injuries but not in an action
for deceit."°' Thus, the plaintiff's case was "based upon
rescission" and he failed since he had not alleged a tender
of the consideration he had received. On the other hand,
there are cases, where for all practical purposes the courts
have allowed the plaintiff to recover in an action for de-
ceit the same amount he would have recovered in an ac-
tion for personal injuries.0 3 While these decisions may
not be correct in theory, they may nevertheless be desir-
able, insofar as they permit an action for personal injuries
without compelling the plaintiff to return the considera-
tion he had received for the fraudulently procured release.
Interesting because of their bearing upon this problem,
are the decisions of the Indiana court. In Rochester Bridge
Co. v. McNeil,2" the trial court was reversed for having
given instructions which led the jury in a deceit action to
allow as damages the amount by which the plaintiff had
202 Urtz v. New York Cent. & H. R. R.R., 137 App. Div. 404, 121 N.Y. Supp.
879 (4th Dep't 1910); Wichita Falls & S. R.R. v. Durham, 132 Tex. 143,
120 S.W.2d 803 (1938).
203 Graham v. Morgan, 129 F. Supp. 199 (NJ). Okla. 1955), was an
action to recover damages incurred because of the defendant's perjury.
The court said at 202: "The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the de-
fendant for that amount which the plaintiff would have recovered had the
defendant not been guilty of such deceit." Russo v. Sofia Bros., Inc., 44 F.
Supp. 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) was an action for deceit for damages sustained
because the defendant had fraudulently acquired a release of a judgment for
a wrongful death action. Hutchings v. Takens, 287 Mich. 96, 282 N.W. 915
(1938) was an action for deceit to obtain a release of a contract claim.
Wessels v. Carr, 15 App. Div. 360, 44 N.Y. Supp. 114 (1st Dep't 1897), appeal
dismissed, 156 N.Y. 683, 50 N.E. 1123 (1898), was an action for deceit in
obtaining a release of a judgment.
The cases involving the release of judgments might be distinguished on
the ground that the amounts involved were liquidated.
204 188 Ind. 432, 122 N.E. 662 (1919).
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been injured by the original tort. The court reasoned that
the measure of damages should be the amount which the
injured party reasonably could have demanded and which
the defendant would reasonably have allowed as a final
compromise above and beyond the sum in fact allowed
and received." 5
It has been held that it is proper for the trial court to
instruct the jury to take into consideration, in fixing the
amount of damages, the negligence of the defendant,2
and ".... such evidence as had been produced upon the
trial showing his suffering both of body and mind, if any,
which he would undergo in the future on account of his,
injuries .... 2 7 The court has gone the farthest in Auto-
mobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Rich," where it is said:
The charge ought to inform the jury that they should
endeavor to discover what that probable amount would
be after considering all of the known or foreseeable
facts and circumstances which in any way affected the
value of the claim on the date of settlement, and having
once arrived at that figure, they should then deduct the
amount already allowed and paid and insert the balance,
if any, in the verdict as the true measure of the damage
suffered. The ultimate fact to be ascertained is the
actual damage caused by the fraudulent representations
and not the damage for the original injury.209
This case purports to restate the rule of Rochester Bridge
Co. v. McNeill. However, the court admits that it may be
enlarging that rule. That this is true would seem to be
apparent when one considers that the court in this case
dwells on the dispute by the doctors about the extent of
the injury to the plaintiff's knee. Such a dispute may have
been important in determining the amount for which the
plaintiff would have been willing to settle. However, one
205 Id. at 666.
206 Indiana Ins. Co. v. Handlon, 216 Ind. 442, 24 N.E.2d 1003 (1940).
207 Southern Ry. v. Jaynes, 86 Ind. App. 451, 140 N.E. 556, 558 (1923).
208 222 Ind. 384, 53 N.E.2d 775 (1944).
209 Id. at 779.
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cannot help believing that the jury will be led to believe
that the plaintiff would have settled only for that amount
which a jury would have been willing to allow him if his
action had been for damages for the personal injury.
From the foregoing it would seem that even in Indiana
there is no certainty that the plaintiff does have an alter-
native action for damages for deceit in these cases. At least
the elements of his proof are in doubt. If the damages are
speculative, or if their proof is difficult to the point of
impossibility, or if the courts persist in saying that the
proof of the damages is in fact a proof of the damages for
the personal injury and, therefore, an ineffective attempt
at an action based on rescission, it would seem that the
plaintiff in these cases does not in fact have an alternative
to the action based upon rescission. This is even more
reason why the courts should not require restoration be-
fore the suit or, at least, why they should be lenient in




From the foregoing it would appear that most courts
have stated, or have assumed, that restoration, a tender of
restoration, or an offer to tender restoration of the con-
sideration received for a release, is a condition precedent
to the avoiding of a release and to the bringing of an ac-
tion on the original tort. Yet, in the application of the rule,
they have been willing to find so many exceptions that if
the requirement is to continue to exist and have meaning,
it would seem necessary to restate it.
A requirement based upon the distinction between law
and equity, or as a necessary element of a rescission, would
seem to be a purely technical requirement that can serve
no useful purpose today. If, therefore, it is to have any
[Vol. XX
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justification it must exist for the purpose of preventing
the plaintiff's unjust enrichment and for the protection
of the defendant. In cases where the plaintiff, having re-
leased his claim, is bringing an action for damages for in-
juries he has sustained, the problem really before the court
is the effect to be given to the release he has signed. "It is
not strictly a proceeding to rescind a contract ... but an
effort to obtain full and adequate compensation notwith-
standing the previous acknowledgment of entire satisfac-
tion by showing that such an acknowledgment was fraudu-
lently procured."21 Since it is desirable to assure the
permanency of releases and settlements, they ought not
to be ignored merely because the plaintiff is dissatisfied
with his bargain. On the other hand, it is unfair to the
plaintiff to allow an unscrupulous defendant to hide behind
such a bargain just because the plaintiff has not restored
the consideration he had been paid. If the plaintiff can
assert just grounds for avoiding the release, no technical
requirement, unless it serves a valid purpose, should be
placed in his way. The question, then, is whether the resto-
ration of the consideration before suit is necessary to pre-
vent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff.
Although they probably would be rare, cases may arise
where an unscrupulous plaintiff might attempt to finance
his action on the original tort by obtaining money from the
defendant on the pretext of signing a release. The insol-
vency of the plaintiff, and the likelihood that he will not
succeed in his action upon the original tort, may make it
desirable for the court to dismiss his petition unless he
first restores to the defendant what he had received under
the release. It may be that this is the only way of adequate-
ly protecting the defendant. Even in these cases, however,
it is not the tender which protects the defendant. What is
needed is an assurance that, if at the conclusion of the
action it is found that the plaintiff is indebted to the de-
230 Texas & P. Ry. v. Jowers, 110 S.W. 946, 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
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fendant, the defendant can obtain payment of that debt.
In most cases that assurance might be given by a judg-
ment against the plaintiff, a credit upon the plaintiff's
judgment against the defendant, a requirement that the
plaintiff tender the property into court, or possibly by
his posting a bond. At some stage of the pleadings or dur-
ing trial it may be advisable to protect the defendant by
requiring payment to the defendant or payment into
court. With such discretionary power the courts could
more effectively protect the defendant against a collection-
proof plaintiff. This is especially true since the courts have
permitted the plaintiff to retain possession of the property
after the defendant has refused the tender. At the same
time with this power the courts could give the honest, but
impecunious, plaintiff his day in court.
Whether the release was void or voidable, whether the
release was procured by fraud in the inducement or fraud
in the execution, whether the plaintiff was misled about
the nature of the instrument or concerning its contents,
whether there was or was not a contract, are not valid dis-
tinctions in determining whether there is or is likely to be
an unjust enrichment. The fact remains that, if the plain-
tiff's contention about the release is correct, he is in pos-
session of property which in most cases does not belong
to him. The nature of the contract or of the fraud by which
the defendant procured it are of little importance. Even
in those cases where the releasor contends that he has
received the consideration as a gift, in the face of a show-
ing of a release signed by him, it is doubtful if he should
be permitted to retain what he has received and still ob-
tain a complete judgment for his damages for personal
injuries. However, the effect of the release does depend
upon the circumstances surrounding and entering into its
procurement. Thus it would seem to make a difference
whether it was procured by fraud or duress, or through
mistake, or while the plaintiff was incompetent. The cul-
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pability of the defendant and of the plaintiff would seem
to be elements to consider in determining what steps are
advisable to protect the defendant. On one hand, the im-
portance of upholding the stability of releases, the pro-
tection of the defendant, and the prevention of unjust en-
richment of the plaintiff should be considered. On the
other hand, we must also consider the necessity of grant-
ing some relief to the plaintiff who has signed a release
which in justice should not bar his action for damages for
the original tort.
Several elements should be considered in determining
the advisability of requiring restoration, or some inter-
mediate relief during the proceedings. The amount of the
consideration which has been paid to the plaintiff, and his
financial ability to repay are such elements. The prompt-
ness with which the plaintiff has acted and the culpability
of both the defendant and the plaintif n would seem to
be important. The court should also consider if, how, and
when the plaintiff has spent the consideration, and whether
the defendant was aware of the plaintiff's financial and
mental condition at the time the release was signed. If the
courts would consider these things, and would mold the
requirement of restoration to best meet the particular case
before them, much of the litigation involving a purely
technical application of the rule could be avoided.
A statute such as that of New York may be necessary
to reach this result. However, it is also possible that the
goal can be attained by judicial decision as in the Marple'
and Rase21 cases. This would entail only an investigation
of the purpose of the rule and its application in the light
of present knowledge and procedures.
Vincent C. Immel*
211 E.g., Whitwell v. Aurora, 139 Mo. App. 597, 123 S.W. 1045 (1909),
where the plaintiff executed the release for the purpose of defrauding a
third party.
212 Marple v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 115 Minn. 262, 132 N.W. 333 (1911).
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